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




THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE CONCEPT OF WORK IN ROUSSEAU'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY

by



KI SU KIM

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Concept of Work in Rousseau's Educational Theory", submitted by KI SU KIM in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education in History of Education.







## DEDICATION

To Dr. Bum Mo Chung, who made it possible for me  
to come to Canada; and  
to Dr. Peter J. Miller, who taught me.





## ABSTRACT

This study explores the concept of work in Jean Jacques Rousseau's educational theory. Treating the educational ideas in the Emile as essentially a projection of Rousseau's phylogenic account of the social progress of man, the study examines the changing role of work activity in a child's education with reference to the role of work in the hypothetical history which describes the move from the state of nature through the civil state and ultimately to a new egalitarian society.

In Chapter One, a justification of the study is provided, together with a brief examination of existing research.

Chapter Two examines the process by which man elevated himself out of the animal state and focusses on the emergence of work and its effect. In the second part of the chapter, an exploration is conducted on Rousseau's views of the infant as a "savage man" and the adolescent as a "savage". It continues with a consideration of Rousseau's educational prescriptions for the different phases of development, utilising the child's activity to fulfill his needs so as to form a grown-up "savage" or a "natural man". The learning of work skills is perceived as the culmination of such activities of the child.

Chapter Three deals with the decline of the state of nature





and the movement of the civil state towards its final phase of "slavery". The elements which Rousseau from time to time blamed as the causes of human degeneration are examined in the context of his hypothetical history. The study then explores the preventive measures to counteract the evils of civil society in the introduction of the "industrial arts" and the adjustment of passions in order to develop reason in adolescence. The chapter ends at the point where the child has completed his being as a "natural man" and has attained a readiness for a proper social life.

Chapter Four examines the new egalitarian society which is proposed as a "political" solution to the existing social evils. The focus of this examination is on the position of the individual man and his relation with his new being as a "citoyen" of the State. The chapter concludes with the position of work both in State-controlled "public" education and in the introduction of Emile to a family and a State.

In Chapter Five the issues which the thesis has explored are summarised in order to determine the position of work in Rousseau's educational theory.





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## CHAPTER ONE:

### Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explicate and analyse Jean Jacques Rousseau's thought concerning the human activity that is usually called "work" and to assess its significance for his educational theory.

Generally speaking, the word "work" in the study corresponds with the French word "travail". In the Western intellectual tradition the concept of work has been usually distinguished from that of "labour". The English word "work" corresponds with "ergazesthai" in Greek, "facere" or "fabricari" in Latin, "werken" in German, and "ouvrer" in French, while the English word "labour" corresponds with "ponein" in Greek, "laborare" in Latin, "arbeiten" in German, and "travailler" in French. In all these languages the equivalents for "labour" had originally a connotation of "pain" and "trouble". The French word "travail", which is the "work" to be examined in this study, derives itself etymologically from "tripalium", a kind of "torture". "Travail" was originally "labour". But in modern French the word "ouvrer" has been historically replaced by the word "travailler", just like the place of the word "werken" in German has



been taken by the word "arbeiten". This implies that both "travailler" and "arbeiten" have now lost the bad connotation of "pain" and "trouble". Born in a time when "the labour of our body which is necessitated by its needs" was regarded as "slavish", the word "travailler" and its equivalents became "normal" and not necessarily "painful" when the actual historical development of society brought labour "out of hiding and into the public realm."<sup>1</sup> In Rousseau's case also the word "travail" no longer has any "painful" connotation. In order to designate a painful, troublesome activity he uses rather the adjective "laboreuse" which corresponds with the English word "labourious". In Rousseau's terminology, the term "travail" does not yet denote the strictly economic activity that appears in labour market. Rather, he uses this term in an anthropological sense that it is a useful human activity, bodily as well as mental. The study will employ this kind of broad definition.

The study will conduct an examination of the concept of work, i.e. "travail", within the educational theory of Rousseau. However, his educational ideas cannot be properly separated from his social and political doctrines;<sup>2</sup> thus the study will not confine itself within a narrow educational scope. Rather, it will follow a path in which Rousseau's concept of work will be exposed both within its educational (or pedagogical) and its social contexts. The study will accept Rousseau's methodological opposition of the state of nature to the civil state in order to arrive at a political solution to man's difficulties.<sup>3</sup> It will, therefore, search for answers to questions such as: What did Rousseau think about the meaning of man's "work" in





the state of nature? How did he perceive the conditions of "work" in the civil state? What were his dreams for the recovery of the proper function of "work" in his ideal, political state? Each of these questions will be examined in relation to his educational ideas as revealed in the Emile and other educational writings. The underlying assumption of this kind of examination of these questions is that Rousseau's educational scheme is basically an ontogenic projection onto individual development of what he phylogenically perceives in social development.

It is not difficult to justify such a study. Rousseau's ideas regarding the concept of work have greatly influenced both educational thought and political doctrines in the modern West. Educationally, for example, elements of Rousseau's thought are found in the notions of "manual work" of Pestalozzi,<sup>4</sup> Gerstensteiner,<sup>5</sup> Woodward,<sup>6</sup> and Dewey.<sup>7</sup> The "politechnical" conception of Marxist pedagogy is clearly in accord with the formula of Rousseau: "While he fancies himself a workman he is becoming a philosopher."<sup>8</sup> Although Rousseau might not have been the first to introduce work into education,<sup>9</sup> he was the first major thinker to integrate manual work into educational prescriptions, not only for developmental purposes but also for an appropriate socialisation and politicisation of children.

Politically, Rousseau's exposition of the mechanism by which "work", as an essential part of independent human life, becomes transformed into a means of enslaving man bears an important historical meaning in that it gave rise to the alienation theories of





human labour which Hegel<sup>10</sup> and Marx<sup>11</sup> later formulated. Rousseau's perception of social alienation was intuitive rather than theoretical, and, as Baczko indicates, he should be seen as an "inspirateur" rather than the "précurseur" to the emerging consciousness of the human condition in later generations. Nevertheless, Baczko continues, "Pensée riche d'inspiration multiples...remplit cette fonction inspiratrice encore de nos jours."<sup>12</sup> An elaboration and fuller exposition of the concept of work in Rousseau's thought will throw important new light upon the nineteenth and twentieth century intellectual and educational contexts.

Unfortunately, however, the concept of "work" in Rousseau's thought has up to now attracted only narrowly based inquiries. No existing research provides a comprehensive perspective for this particular concept. There are three viewpoints from which Rousseau's ideas concerning "work" have been approached. First, there has been, and still is, a "functional" psychological point of view. In 1912 Claparède noted in the Emile a "conception fonctionnelle" of childhood, characterised by several laws: loi de succession génétique, loi d'exercice génético-fonctionnelle, loi d'adaptation fonctionnelle, loi d'autonomie fonctionnelle, and loi d'individualité.<sup>13</sup> Opposing the notion of "fonction" to that of "structure", Claparède established a perspective in which Rousseau's educational theory was to be viewed and explained: "Ce n'est pas tout que d'avoir des organes; il faut encore savoir s'en servir; et plus ces organes sont développés, plus le travail que l'on en demande est précis et délicats, plus doit être longue la période nécessaire à les en rendre capables."<sup>14</sup> Claparède



viewed the "fonction" of an organism as one of the conditions for the formation of its "structure"; so, in his viewpoint, both "fonction" and "structure" composed two "inseparable" aspects of an organism, "développement" thus denoting "une stimulation, un exercice continu des organes à développer,"<sup>15</sup> in other words, a functional phenomenon. In Rousseau, Claparède thought, the "exercice" which is truly functional "consiste à faire jouer la fonction dans son contexte vital, c'est-à-dire dans les conditions où elle est précisément une fonction, un instrument utile."<sup>16</sup> Along the same lines, Henri Wallon in 1958 indicated "les méthodes actives" as one of three principles in the educational scheme of the Emile.<sup>17</sup> Wallon noted of "les méthodes actives", which are found in the views of Rousseau, Decroly, and other modern educators, that "il faut mettre à la base de tout enseignement l'observation concrète et expérimentation", and, in addition to this, that "de connaissances particulières l'enfant a besoin de ses yeux et de son jugement."<sup>18</sup> In this context, Wallon directs attention to the requirement that the child must be put "en rapport direct avec l'objet à transformer ou à manipuler et en tous cas de lui faire inventer et construire lui-même ses premiers instruments." In addition, he insists that the child will see through such activities "non pas un outil à structure mystérieuse et à effets artificiels, mais comme un prolongement ou comme l'utilisation de ce qui est donné par la nature elle-même."<sup>19</sup> So, in the line that connects Claparède to Wallon, the work of the child becomes a functional activity that brings him into contact with his environmental reality, making him understand and work to change it. As Bernard Prémât indicates, Claparède's perception of Rousseau's educational ideas lays importance on the "corps et





conditions physiologiques de l'éducation."<sup>20</sup> It may be possible, therefore, to also treat Louis Bergener's discussion of manual work in the Emile in the context of such an orientation.<sup>21</sup>

Alongside this "fonctionnel" perspective, there is a second one which focusses upon the sociological concept of the "work" of the child. Jean Chateau in 1966<sup>22</sup> and in 1969<sup>23</sup> elaborated an interpretation of Rousseau's educational ideas as a logical interrelation between three important terms, "Dieu", "nature" and "société",<sup>24</sup> characterising Rousseau's pedagogy as being concerned with "l'intégration de l'homme dans la société morale, qui constitue la vocation proprement humaine."<sup>25</sup> According to Jean Chateau, for Rousseau the redemption of man in society must be a response to the "voix divine", to the "voix céleste" and to the "Providence", which originally called man to form society. As the Savoyard vicar says in the Emile, "man is by nature sociable, or at least fitted to become sociable."<sup>26</sup> Education in this connection is a kind of "dénaturation" on the one hand - because it is socialisation - and on the other hand an activity that observes the "nature entendue dans un sens plus large et plus spirituel."<sup>27</sup> From such a perspective Jean Chateau locates "le métier manuel" in an age when the child has to sense "la différence du travail à l'amusement", when "des objets d'utilité" first enter his consciousness.<sup>28</sup> Manual work is thus characterised as that which "couronner et coordonner"<sup>29</sup> all the child's activities in his actual, living conditions of life. The denaturing function of manual work was termed in 1975 a "dénaturation positive" by Michele Ansart-Dourlan. Like Jean Chateau, Michele Ansart-Dourlan focusses on





two aspects of "work": first, the function fulfilled by it or on the notion of utility, and, second, the way in which Rousseau's liberating ideals transformed themselves politically into proposals which are not "liberal", along, in fact, a line of socialisation. As she points out, "[L]e droit à la propriété et le travail vont contribuer à une dénaturation positive de l'individu afin de le rendre apte à la vie sociale et politique telle que la conçoit Rousseau."<sup>30</sup> In this context Raymond Polin viewed the "arts d'industrie" as something without which the independence of each individual might disappear.<sup>31</sup>

The perspective from which man's work is viewed as a precondition for the preparation of a free and independent life in society is closely related to a third perspective, that which treats "work" as an activity inherent in, or natural to, but historically estranged from, man. In 1970 Fred Caloren examined the Rousseauist concept of "work" and concluded that Rousseau was "un des précurseurs s'affirme aujourd'hui comme un contrecourant puissant au sein de notre société contemporaine."<sup>32</sup> Focussing on the political aspect of work, Caloren perceives man's activity, particularly "work", as being "le moyen pour l'homme de s'extérioriser."<sup>33</sup> In Caloren's interpretation Rousseau perceived the condition of modern man as being characterised above all by "aliénation", the "extériorisation" of his existence as being exposed to endless labour:

...Civilised man...is always moving, sweating, toiling and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he goes on in drudgery to his last moment, and even seeks death to put himself in a position to live, or renounces life to acquire immortality.<sup>34</sup>

Caloren in this context relates Rousseau's ideas to Freud's



understanding of the "comportement psychique," and to the political thought of Hegel and Eric Weil.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, Willy Desmoucelle in 1973 subsumed the concept of "work" in Rousseau's writings under the question of "le Mien, le Tien", that is, the question of "propriété."<sup>36</sup> Certainly, by being related to the formation of property, "work" bears a social meaning, both positive and negative. Property as the product of human work, plays for Rousseau a decisive role both positive and negative, in man's struggle to achieve an independent life.

These three perspectives found in the existing literature tend to be partial and onesided. This is because the writers adopting these perspectives deal with the concept of "work" only in examining other aspects of Rousseau's ideas which attract more seriously their interest. Their discussion is based therefore only upon certain of Rousseau's writings. For example, the first perspective focusses on the Emile; the second, mainly on the Emile and the Contrat Social; and the third, on the two Discourses and the Contrat Social. It is true, of course, that the Emile deals with pedagogical questions connected with the development of the individual, while the Discourses and the Contrat Social discuss the problems that arise in the development of civil society. In spite of such differences, however, the problem-consciousness that runs through Rousseau's writings must be assumed to constitute a single whole. For example, it is not difficult to find in the educational scheme of the Emile a projection of the methodological opposition of the state of nature to the civil state, and a blueprint for a new, ideal society, both of which are





major themes of the Contrat Social. It is hoped that, by integrating all the relevant literature under a more comprehensive perspective, a fuller apprehension of Rousseau's conception of work and its role in education may be attained.

Rousseau's thinking concerning man's work and its relationship to pedagogy is properly understood only in connection with his socio-political writings. This study is basically a study of Rousseau's concept of "work" in his own terms. Its connection with the ideas of his predecessors and his followers is out of the scope of this research. The concern of this study is, rather, to examine the position of the concept of "work" in Rousseau's own socio-political and educational doctrines. Thus, the study is to be conducted on the basis of a careful examination of Rousseau's own writings, rather than secondary interpretations. This kind of research is obviously more likely to produce controversial conclusions. The writer is well aware of this; however, he is also aware that the progress of human knowledge has been always motivated through new approaches to the original sources.

The writings of Rousseau that include relevant material on the concept of work are many. Written prior to the Emile, the Origine de l'Inégalité (1755), developing certain themes initiated in les Sciences et les Arts (1750), establishes a view of the role of "work" both in the state of nature and in the civil state. Whether Rousseau was influenced by others, such as Locke,<sup>37</sup> he bestows in this discourse a new connotation upon man's work. The Origine de





l'Inégalité, therefore, must be considered as an indispensable source for this study. The Emile (1762) also belongs to the necessary source because it is the major work in which the educational conception of "work" is presented. The Contrat Social (1762) and the Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne (1772) are also important because they suggest political solutions to the social and educational problems raised by a consideration of the concept of work. Some useful idealised depictions of what work could be like in a pastoral setting are found in the Nouvelle Héloïse (1761). This, together with the Origine des Langues (1755), which is complementary to the two Discourses, and with the Rêveries (1776-8), which also contain important intuitions concerning the human condition in society, will become part of the primary sources. English versions of these texts will be used if they exist and if the translation is consistent with the French original.

The study will consist of three parts, each dealing with one of the three states by which Rousseau conceived the historical development of society: that is, the state of nature, the civil state, and a new society. In each part consideration will be given to educational questions arising out of the concept of "work".

In Chapter Two, the concept of work will be discussed in terms of the physical and social conditions of the life of the savage. The primitive mode of production will be examined in relation to the primitive mode of life, revealing the conditions which made possible the independence and liberty of the individual. Such a discussion



will expose the meaning of the term "the state of nature" in Rousseau's writings. The chapter will then examine Rousseau's educational principles for the young Emile, who is assumed to be a "savage", particularly in terms of the concepts of isolation, physical and sensual training, the "méthodes actives", and the introduction of the notion of utility. By drawing a kind of parallel between the condition of man in the state of nature and the pedagogical prescription for early childhood, this second step will attempt to show that Rousseau argued for a restoration in childhood of the conditions that enabled primitive man to enjoy liberty and independence in self-sufficiency.

Chapter Three will focus on the shift from the state of nature to the civil state and the consequent demeaning of man and his work. What made man change his modes of production? How did such a change occur? What are the meaning of "alienation" and "slavery"? These kinds of questions will be discussed in terms of the changes that occurred in man's work. The chapter will then examine Rousseau's criticism of the existing education, which, he believed, neglected the active and physical elements in learning and perpetuated the slavery and dependence of man. The discussion will conclude with a consideration of Rousseau's "méthodes actives", whose crown is the notion of manual work.

Chapter Four will be concerned with Rousseau's political and educational prescriptions for the evils of the existing society. The human condition that Rousseau aimed at in advancing his doctrine of





the "social contract" will be examined in terms of the concept of work. Special attention will be paid to why Rousseau created the notion of "citoyen" in order to solve the social problems that "homme" could not. The notions of "liberty" and "equality", the resolution of "alienation" through a total alienation, the status of the natural, independent man (homme) in "civil society", the view of property - all these bear upon the new conditions of man's work. The second part of this chapter will examine the meaning and effect of physical work in the education of a "citoyen". The shifts in education from "negative" to "positive", from "domestic" to "public", from "solitude" to "sociability", from "sensation" to "reason", from "amusement" to "utility" - all these bear upon the concept of work as an educational activity. Thus an attempt will be made to relate the concept of work in Rousseau's educational prescriptions to the human condition which he visualises in the State created by the "social contract".

Finally in the concluding chapter, the position of the concept of work in Rousseau's educational doctrine will be summarised and a brief assessment of its significance will be given.





## NOTES

1 Arendt, H., The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958, pp. 80-8 passim.

2 That the educational doctrine in the Emile is essentially in accord with the political doctrine in the Contrat Social is summarised by Henri Roddier like this: "Le trait le plus fondamental demeure pourtant le retour au monde primitif, originel, qui constitue l'enfance des hommes, comme celle des sociétés, et sur lequel on doit chercher à reconstruire l'homme et les sociétés nouvelles." Roddier, H., "Education et Politique chez J.-J. Rousseau," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau et son Oeuvre, Commémoration et Colloque de Paris (16-20 October 1962) organised by the Comité National pour la Commémoration de J.-J. Rousseau, Librairie C. Klincksieck, Paris, 1964, p. 193.

3 This is the basic plan of his exposition of the social reality as shown in the Origine de l'Inégalité and the Contrat Social.

4 See, for example, chapter 10 of Power, E.J., Evolution of Educational Doctrine: Major Educational Thoughts of the Western World, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1969, pp. 272-307.

5 Gerstensteiner's Arbeitschule was apparently strongly influenced by Rousseau's idea regarding the travail manuel. See, for example, Bennett, C.A., History of Manual and Industrial Education, 1870 to 1917, Chas. A. Bennett Co. Inc., Peoria, 1937, pp. 184-9 and pp. 215-6.

6 "With the Manual Training School successfully launched, Woodward was widely projected before the public as the protagonist of a new movement..." Cremin, L.A., The Transformation of the School, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1961, p. 28.

7 For example, see chapters 15, 19 and 23 of Dewey, J., Democracy and Education, The MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1963 (1916), and the chapters XI and XII of Dewey, J., Art as Experience, Capricone Books, New York, 1958 (1934).

8 Emile, Oeuvres Complètes, Paris: Gallimard, 1959-69 (hereafter abridged to "OC"), p. 443; Emile, translated by Foxley, B., Everyman's Library, London, 1955 (hereafter abridged to "EM/E"), p. 140. Henri Wallon quotes this in order to relate Rousseau to the "enseignement polytechnique" of Marx in the "Introduction" to Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Emile ou de l'Education, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1958, p. 25.

9 For example, Locke. See Sections 125-9 of Locke, J., Some Thoughts concerning Education, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,



1934 (1692-3), pp. 108-112.

10 See Besse, G., "De Jean-Jacques Rousseau à Hegel: Prémices d'une 'Phénoménologie'", in Hegel Jahrbuch, 1974, pp. 490-5. Also see Caloren, F., "Travail, Droque, Révolution: La Révolte contre le Temps," in Diogene, No. 70, April-June 1970, pp. 108-29.

11 For example, see Lecerclé, J.-L., "Rousseau et Marx," in Rousseau after Two Hundred Years, ed. by Leigh, R.A., proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 67-69.

12 Baczko, B., "Rousseau et l'Aliénation Sociale," in Annales J.-J. Rousseau, 1959-62, p. 224.

13 Claparède, E., "J.-J. Rousseau et la Conception Fonctionnelle de l'Enfance," in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, the Year 20, 1912, pp. 391-416.

14 Ibid., pp.393-4.

15 Ibid., p. 394.

16 Ibid.

17 Wallon, H., op. cit., p.24.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 25.

20 Prémât, B., "L'Education de l'Homme Nouveau," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau au Présent, ed. and publ. by the Association des Amis de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Grenoble, 1978, p. 205.

21 Bergener, L., L'Education Corporelle selon Rousseau et Pestalozzi, J. Vrin, Paris, 1973. The first part of this book, which deals with Rousseau, was presented to a Symposium International d'Histoire, Banff, Alberta, Canada, June, 1971, under the title Jean-Jacques Rousseau et l'Education Physique.

22 Chateau, J., "Jean-Jacques Rousseau ou la Pédagogie de la Vocation Humaine," in Les Grands Pédagogues, ed. by Chateau, J., Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1966, pp. 171-212.

23 Chateau, J., Rousseau: sa Philosophie de l'Education, J. Vrin, Paris, 1969.

24 Ibid., p. 135, and Chateau, J., op. cit., p. 176.

25 Ibid., p. 173.

26 Emile, OC, IV, p. 600; EM/E, p. 253.





27 Chateau, J., "Jean-Jacques Rousseau ou la Pédagogie..." p. 177.

28 Ibid., p. 198.

29 Ibid., p. 199.

30 Ansart-Dourlan, M., Dénaturation et Violence dans la Pensée de J.-J. Rousseau, Klincksieck, Paris, 1975, p. 99.

31 Polin, R., La Politique de la Solitude: Essai sur la Philosophie Politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Editions Sirey, Paris, 1971, pp. 271-5.

32 Caloren, F., op. cit., p. 118.

33 Ibid., p. 117.

34 Inégalité, OC. III, p. 192; Cole, G.D.H. (tr.), The Social Contract and Discourses, London: Everyman's Library, 1935 (hereafter abridged to "SC/E"), pp. 236-7. Caloren quotes this sentence in the same place.

35 Caloren, F., op. cit., p. 119.

36 Demoucelle, W., La Question de la Propriété chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau, unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1973.

37 Ansart-Dourlen indicates Locke's influence like this: "Rousseau reprend des thèmes empruntés à Locke: le travail contribue à fonder le droit de propriété; de plus, la valeur du travail s'estime en fonction de son utilité par rapport à l'homme, en second lieu relativement à la collectivité; enfin, Rousseau admet, comme Locke, que la propriété privée apparaît donc comme une formation seconde, d'origine sociale, à partir d'une appartenance commune de la terre à tous les hommes." Ansart-Dourlen, op. cit., p. 99.





## CHAPTER TWO:

### Work, the Savage and the Child

#### 1. Work and the Savage

THE STATE OF NATURE. -- In order to explicate Rousseau's concept of work as an activity of man (and child) in the state of nature, it is necessary first to come to some understanding of what he meant, or might have meant, by the term "state of nature". It was upon his view of such a state, where "no cunning or knavish mortal"<sup>1</sup> came between man and man or between man and his environment, that Rousseau constructed a revolutionary social and educational doctrine, one in which the concept of work was a central element.

Assuming a "state of nature" to have existed in the historical development of human society, and opposing this to the existing society, Rousseau is able to expose the evils of the latter. "Everything is good", he insists, "when it leaves the hands of the Author of things: everything degenerates in the hands of man."<sup>2</sup> Since the departure from the state of nature is regarded as the critical point at which the evils of the civil state begin to appear,



the remedy for the ills in society appears to lie in recovering what was lost at the time men left this state. So in Rousseau's writings we find a cyclical theme, a kind of dialectical movement, which Bénichou characterises with three Christian terms, "Eden-Chute-Rédemption", that is, "nature première, nature déchue, grâce réparatrice,"<sup>3</sup> or, in the words of J.M. Murry, "Nature, outside society; Anti-Nature within society; the new Nature within a new society."<sup>4</sup> For Rousseau, then, "nature" or the "state of nature" is the finishing as well as the starting point in his argument.

Such an outlook is, however, not necessarily "historical". Among the interpreters of Rousseau's writings there have been two different views regarding the historical status of the state of nature. As Plattner indicates, one group of the interpreters views Rousseau's state of nature as a "picture of the historical conditions of the first men", while the other holds that it was "meant to be a purely hypothetical or suppositional construct, whose relation to the actual historical situation of the first men is utterly irrelevant."<sup>5</sup> A careful reading of Rousseau's writings, however, will show that neither interpretation fully comprehends the true status of the state of nature in history.

In the "Preface" of the Origine de l'Inégalité Rousseau himself indicates that the state of nature is essentially a methodological construct or concept: "I have entered upon certain arguments, and risked some conjectures, less in the hope of solving the difficulty, than with a view to throwing some light upon it, and





reducing the questions to its proper form."<sup>6</sup> These methodological "conjectures" are undertaken in order to distinguish properly what is original from what is artificial in the actual nature of man.<sup>7</sup> In Rousseau's own words, a state of nature which "no longer exists, perhaps never did exist, and probably never will exist" is, despite its conjectural elements, useful for forming "a proper judgment of our present state,"<sup>8</sup> and for solving the question of the "origin of the mystery and burden of men."<sup>9</sup> Rousseau admits that such a suppositional approach to the question may require "more philosophy than can be imagined to enable any one to determine exactly what precautions he ought to take, in order to make solid observations on this subject."<sup>10</sup> He therefore subjugates his examination of the "state of nature" to a strict conceptual manipulation of the term.

Let us begin then by laying facts aside, as they do not affect the question. The investigations we may enter into, in treating this subject, must not be considered as historical truths, but only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin; just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world.<sup>11</sup>

In Rousseau's conceptual "experiments" the notion of the state of nature is a "hypothesis", a calculated assumption, rather than a description of the actual origin of things. This supposed primitive state, nevertheless, could not be an arbitrary "conjecture" because the elimination of the "errors and prejudices" of Rousseau's contemporaries concerning human misery could only be achieved by a "thorough digging down to the root of the question". So Rousseau declares: "I...therefore thought it incumbent on me to...show, by means of a true picture of the state of nature, how inequality, even



natural, is far from having as much reality and influence as our writers claim."<sup>12</sup> The "state of nature" has to be a "true picture" even though it is no more than an assumption. Rousseau thus believes that his "state of nature" has a certain historical validity.

I confess that, as the events I am going to describe might have happened in various ways, I have nothing to determine my choice but conjectures; but such conjectures become reasons, when they are the most probable that can be drawn from the nature of things, and the only means of discovering the truth. The consequences, however, which I mean to deduce will not be merely conjectural; as, on the principles just laid down, it would be impossible to form any other theory that would not furnish the same results, and from which I could not draw the same conclusions.<sup>13</sup>

In order to make sure that his analysis of the state of nature goes beyond conjectures, Rousseau develops "a style adapted to all nations...forgetting time and space,"<sup>14</sup> out of travellers' tales and ancient recordings, thus initiating an anthropology, a study of "a people in far regions where the inhabitants still remain their natural inclinations."<sup>15</sup>

...It is true that I have not confined my observations within the walls of any one town, nor a single class of people; but having compared men of every class and every nation which I have been able to observe in the course of a life spent in this pursuit, I have discarded as artificial what belonged to one nation and not to another, to one rank and not to another; and I have regarded as proper to mankind what was common to all, at any age, in any station, and in any nation whatsoever.<sup>16</sup>

Therefore in Rousseau's writings the notion of the state of nature bears an historical meaning no less than a hypothetical character. As a methodological hypothesis it provides a criterion for the attack on the evils in the existing society; however, it is only when such a hypothesis is perceived by men to be true that the attack can strike a revolutionary note.





An appreciation of the dual character of the notion of the state of nature - the state of nature as a hypothesis and as a fact - is useful in understanding the seemingly contradictory arguments which we find sometimes in Rousseau's writings.

THE SAVAGE MAN. -- What then was the original condition of man in the state of nature? In Rousseau's hypothesis the state of nature is theoretically a purely "natural" state where "the earth was left to its natural fertility and covered with immense forests, whose trees were never mutilated by the axe", providing "sustenance and shelter for every species of animal."<sup>17</sup> Men in this original state were "dispersed up and down among the rest [of animals]", and would "observe and imitate their industry...and live upon most of the different foods, which other animals shared among themselves."<sup>18</sup> This man, though he differed from other animals in several important aspects, was hardly different in quality. "Left by nature solely to the direction of instinct", man in the original state must "begin with purely animal functions."<sup>19</sup>

The animal man, whom Rousseau calls "the savage man" (l'homme sauvage), is concerned only with his own welfare and preservation, and relies for this purpose on his bodily strength and instinct. In the purely natural state man becomes strong and robust if he comes well formed into the world, and is destroyed if he does not. "The only instrument he understands" is his own body: he uses it "for various purposes, of which ours, for want of practice, are incapable."<sup>20</sup>



Self-preservation being his chief and almost sole concern, the savage man "must exercise most of those faculties which are most concerned with attack or defence, either for overcoming his prey, or for preventing himself from becoming the prey of other animals."<sup>21</sup> The use of the body as the means of self-preservation retards the development of particular aspects of sensation; "those organs which are perfected only by softness and sensuality will remain in a gross and imperfect state, incompatible with any sort of delicacy."<sup>22</sup> Consequently, "his senses being divided on this point, his touch and taste will be extremely coarse, his sight, hearing and smell exceedingly fine and subtle."<sup>23</sup> All in all, the life of the savage man is that of an animal "limited at first to mere sensations, and hardly profiting by the gifts nature bestowed on him, much less capable of entertaining a thought of forcing anything from her."<sup>24</sup> Relying upon the produce of the earth for what he wants,<sup>25</sup> this man has "only the sentiments and intellect suited to that state."<sup>26</sup> He feels only his true needs, sees only what he believes he has an interest to see, and his intelligence makes no more progress than his vanity.<sup>27</sup> He eats when hungry, fights back when attacked, and slumbers all the rest of time: he is indolent and stupid.

Conducting such an instinct-ruled life, the savage man hardly recognises other human beings as individuals. Differentiation and relation come from comparison; but, absorbed into nature itself, this man does not need to compare either things or men. Being the captive of his instinct, he seeks heterosexual partners only when he is obliged by his passion, and, as soon as passion is gone, forgets them.





Even his children are meaningless to him. "Wandering in the forests, without industry, without speech, without domicile, without war and without liaisons, with no need of his fellow men, likewise with no desire to harm them"<sup>28</sup> the savage man is truly solitary: "Natural man is entirely for himself; he is a numerical unity, an absolute whole."<sup>29</sup> As long as there are no social relations, there can be in the original state, no morals, no language, no productive activity.

Such a hypothesis of the purely natural state of man - l'homme d'animalité - distinguishes the original man from any who are in the "civil" society. Like an animal this man is completely a part of nature and acts only according to the necessity of nature, which his instinct tells him. This hypothesis, however, makes it difficult to explain how man could have created from natural conditions what is unnatural, that is, what is "civil". And if one clings to the hypothesis of the existence of such a natural state, an explanation of the emergence of a civil state is impossible. Man, if he were merely an animal, could not create civility. If the emergence of a civil state is supposed to have occurred by a natural process, then the civil state must in a sense be potential and inherent in the purely natural state. Rousseau thus makes another hypothesis, arguing that there are certain qualities which are peculiar to man and absent in animals.

Like Descartes, Rousseau, under the influence of the materialism of the time, views man as a "human machine". Unlike Descartes, however, he rejects the existence of reason in the original



man. Instead of reason he finds the existence of simple senses: "Man does not begin with reasoning; he begins with feeling."<sup>30</sup> The human machine, equipped with the faculty of sensation, has certain subjective elements which enables him to act spontaneously. These elements are called sometimes "instinct", sometimes "passions", sometimes "dispositions". Closely connected to sensation, these passions naturally direct man both to preserve himself and to pity the suffering of other sentient creatures. The passion that performs the former function is called "amour de soi-même", while that which performs the latter is called "pity" (pitié) or "compassion". The importance of these two native passions for the peace of the natural state is crucial. Nevertheless, such passions, being attributes of sensation, are not peculiar to man. Animals, being sentient, have such instinctual passions; moreover they too form simple ideas out of simple sensations, and, to a certain extent, combine those simple ideas. If there is any difference, "it is only in degree."<sup>31</sup>

In order to distinguish man from animals, in order to explicate the movement beyond the state of instinct, Rousseau has to presume the existence of some other kind of higher and crucial qualities in the original man, qualities by which man could develop reason out of passions and sensations. Rousseau thus presumes two additional qualities. First, man has a free will, while other animals do not.

I see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine, to which nature hath given senses to wind itself up, and to guard itself, to a certain degree, against anything that might tend to disorder or destroy it. I perceive exactly the same in human machine, with this difference, that in the operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some





share in his own operations, in his character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free-will: hence the brute cannot deviate from the rule prescribed to it, even when it would be advantageous for it to do so; and, on the contrary, man frequently deviates from such rules to his own prejudice.<sup>32</sup>

Secondly, man has a faculty of self-perfection (perfectibilité).

...[T]here is another very specific quality which will admit of no dispute. This is the faculty of self-perfection [la faculté de se perfectionner], which, by the help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the species as in the individual: whereas the brute is, at the end of a few months, all he will ever be during his whole life, and his species, at the end of thousand years, exactly what it was the first year of that thousand.<sup>33</sup>

Certainly, if these faculties are natural to man, man must be from the first different from other animals. By his free-will he will be able to "deviate" from the necessity that nature forces upon him as well as upon other animals. He may, because of free-will, suppress and even control, rather than obey, his instinct, and thus be, in a sense, a moral being. On the other hand, if man possesses naturally the faculty of self-perfection, he is able by himself to develop his other faculties, though gradually, until he becomes a fully rational being. Thus the origin of man-made civilisation may be explained by reference to faculties present in man in the original state.

However, the contradiction between Rousseau's hypothesis and the "facts" is still not resolved. If such faculties did exist "naturally", the man in the purely natural and therefore original state must be already different from other animals. His free-will, already independent from, and even superior to, his instinct, must liberate him from the strict rule of necessity in nature. And, if the faculty of self-perfection - "perfectibilité" - is natural to man,



reason and all man-made institutions including their evils become natural. Rousseau therefore elaborates a dynamic explanation.

According to him, the faculty of self-perfection, together with other faculties, does not develop by itself, although possessed by man naturally. Only with the "fortuitous concurrence of many foreign causes" can the potential basic faculties develop, pushing man beyond the primitive conditions. Rousseau views these foreign causes as "accidents."<sup>34</sup> The following quote from the Fragments Politiques shows what an important role Rousseau sees the environment playing in determining the nature of the existence of man:

Thus everything is reduced in the first place to subsistence, and, by this, man clings to all that surrounds him. He depends on everything, and becomes what this dependence forces him to be. Climate, sun, air, water, the products of the earth and ocean, these form his temperament, his character, determines his tastes, his passions, his works, his actions of every kind.<sup>35</sup>

Rousseau's emphasis upon the importance of the environment has caused interpreters of Rousseau's writings to draw a causal relation between the power of the environment and the perfectibility of man.<sup>36</sup> However, the influence of the environment upon the manifestation of the perfectibility of man is indirect rather than direct. For it should be emphasised that Rousseau's argument focusses on the effect of environment upon the activity of man, which is an expression of his needs.

Man cannot satisfy himself by himself; his needs which are being born incessantly force him to look outside himself for the means by which he might fulfill them. He relies always upon things and often upon those who are similar to himself. We feel more or less this dependence in the range and nature of our needs, and it is in these very needs, more or less great, more or less felt, that we have to look for the principle of all the actions of man.<sup>37</sup>





Man then is naturally endowed with the potentiality of self-perfection. While still in a state of animality, he acts to fulfill his physical needs so as to maintain his existence. Unable to "satisfy himself by himself", he tries to find "things" and "those who are similar to himself" in the external world. It is the difficulty he experiences in fulfilling his needs that causes him to express his potential for self-perfection.

...difficulties soon presented themselves, and it became necessary to learn how to surmount them: the height of the trees, which prevented him from gathering their fruits, the competition of other animals desirous of the same fruits, and the ferocity of those who needed them for their own preservation, all obliged him to apply himself to bodily exercises. He had to be active, swift of foot, and vigorous in fight. Natural weapons, stones and sticks, were easily found: he learnt to surmount the obstacles of nature, to contend in case of necessity with other animals, and to dispute for the means of subsistence even with other men, or to indemnify himself for what he was forced to give up to a stranger.<sup>38</sup>

Rousseau then finds in the savage man an ability to

attain even to the instinct of the beasts, with the advantage that, whereas every species of brutes was confined to one particular instinct, man, who perhaps has not any one peculiar to himself, would appropriate them all...and thus to find this subsistence much more easily than any of the rest.<sup>39</sup>

And he bids welcome to a new stage of the state of nature, one which man's activity, thanks to the manifestation of his capacity for self-perfection, inescapably brought about.

The activity which directly, and immediately, connects the need to its fulfilment, e.g. drinking water when thirsty, plucking fruits when hungry, sleeping when sleepy, etc., does not get beyond the category of instinctual response; however, when man begins to utilise his knowledge concerning the relationships between things and



to calculate the result of his action, increasing his efficiency by mobilising "stones and sticks", then his activity becomes charged with certain intentional purposes. Compared with the purely passive nature of the instinctual activities, this new kind of activity provides a possibility for man to create a new life by his own hands, surmounting "the obstacles of nature". Work appears in this new life and it is this work, rather than the potentiality for self-perfection, that distinguishes man from other animals.

THE EMERGENCE OF WORK. -- The shift from the original, natural state to a state of "new enlightenment" (nouvelle lumière) is, as we have seen, possible only in man's action on - or interaction with - his environment which consequently enables him to develop his potential faculties of free-will and self-perfection. Positively, this action may be generally perceived as distinctive human activity, because it is this activity that ultimately separates man from other animals, and in this broader sense the action of man upon his environment may be subsumed under the concept of work. But, if work is defined, in Sohn-Rethel's words, as something that "constitutes purposeful activity", the instinctual and automatic response of the animal man has to be distinguished from work in its proper sense. In order to be work the physical endeavour must be guided by the "purpose" to "its intended goal as a consequential pursuit", no matter what kind of endeavour it might be.<sup>40</sup> Thus the emergence of the activity of work in the state of nature presupposes man's ability to foresee the result of his action. According to Sohn-Rethel, "no human





labour can take place without a degree of unity of head and hand."<sup>41</sup> The development of the activity of the savage man into work must then have been grounded on a certain degree of intellectual progress. However, this intellectual progress, the consequence of the manifestation of "perfectibility", was itself developed by the human activity that we generally call "work". This reciprocal process merits more discussion.

Theoretically man in the original, natural state did not work. Relying upon the produce of the earth, he did not need to produce intentionally what he needed. He ate what he accidentally found; he slept wherever was suitable for sleeping. Subject to his instinctual demands, his activity was confined to procuring what he desired at the moment and consequently he thought nothing of the future. He ate when food was available, and endured hunger when it was not. His life was entirely dependent on natural conditions and he did not know how, indeed did not need, to change his environment so as to fit it for his use. It is true, of course, that certain animal activities, such as that of beavers who build dams, that of bees who gather honey, etc., may appear to be a kind of work. Whether or not such activities were present in the animal man (theoretically it is denied), they are not regarded as work because the animals who do such "work" conduct their activity only in an environmental condition that enables them to do so. Their "work" reveals itself as a mere automatic and non-reflective habit. So the man of animality was, just like other animals, merely a part of nature, his destiny being determined by environmental conditions.



Rousseau's drama of hominification starts at the moment when man faces external difficulties which he cannot overcome. Under natural conditions man's survival was possible only when external circumstances were favourable to him. But, when circumstances were unfavourable, he experienced a disparity between his needs and what was available. This condition is perceived by Rousseau as the "weakness" (faiblesse), or "insufficiency" (insuffisance), of mankind.<sup>42</sup> Faced with primitive misery and weakness, man began to utilise materials at hand in order to fit them to his physical needs. From his accumulated sense experiences man constituted simple ideas. This was possible among other sentient animals. But, because of his potential perfectibility, man began to compare such simple ideas; in other word, he began to reflect on his simple experiences: "Reflexion comes from compared ideas, and it is the plurality of ideas that makes man compare those ideas."<sup>43</sup> Simple ideas, which were "compared sensations", already included a certain element of judgment, albeit "purely passive". However, the comparison of simple ideas eventually leads to an "active judgment", and thus to a "perception". By comparing simple ideas, the savage man "approaches [to the things in the external world], compares [them], and determines the relations which sensations do not determine."<sup>44</sup>

This repeated relevance of various beings to himself, and one to another, would naturally give rise in the human mind to the perceptions of certain relations between them. Thus the relations which we denote by the terms, great, small, strong, weak, swift, slow, fearful, bold, and the like, almost insensibly compared at need, must have a length produced in him a kind of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence, which would indicate to him the precautions most necessary to his security.<sup>45</sup>

The appearance of the faculty of "comparison" was a momentous





development for the emergence of work because, for Rousseau, "to compare" means "to judge" and it was the faculty of judgment that rendered mind "active."<sup>46</sup> The ability of comparison, a "sensible reason" (raison sensible), enabled "the perception of certain relations" between various objects and events, warned against dangers, indicating "the precautions most necessary to his security", and taught the most useful means for procuring what was necessary. It was by this "sensible reason" that the savage man began, to some extent, to foresee immediate outcomes and engage in intentional and purposeful actions so as to satisfy his needs.

Even though Rousseau does not specifically explain the beginning of work, we may, with reference to Sohn-Rethel's definition, safely assume that it began with the appearance of the primitive judgment, or reason, and will. With the emerging reason the savage man began to lay constraints upon his passions and to elaborate new ways to fulfill his needs more easily and more satisfactorily. The acquisition of techniques (nouvelles industries) corresponded with new mental abilities (nouvelles lumières), and secured the provision of what was necessary by establishing man's superiority over his environment, not only over things but also over animals that had been competing with him for food.

The new intelligence which resulted from this development increased his superiority over other animals, by making him sensible of it. He would now endeavour, therefore, to snare them, would play them a thousand tricks, and though many of them might surpass him in swiftness or in strength, would in time become the master of some and the scourge of others.<sup>47</sup>

At first, the techniques brought by the emerging reason must



have been scarcely enough to enable the savage man to fulfill his immediate needs. But, sooner or later, he was able to attain a surplus power, while animals, and even man himself until this time, had only the powers necessary for preservation.<sup>48</sup> The development of surplus powers, or surplus abilities, and of new techniques enabled man to think of something other than his own preservation. Besides the amour de soi - the passion for preservation, - a certain kind of vanity, namely amour-propre, was formed, initially towards things and later towards other men.

Thus, the first time he looked into himself, he felt the first emotion of pride; and, at a time when he scarce knew how to distinguish the different orders of beings, by looking upon his species as of the highest order, he prepared the way for assuring pre-eminence as an individual.<sup>49</sup>

With the appearance of the amour-propre, man had to fulfill not only his physical but also psychological needs. This means that man's needs - particularly the needs that come from vanity - grew at a greater rate than his ability to produce. Man came to produce more; meanwhile, his need increased still more. On the positive side, "these first advances finally put man in a position to make more rapid ones. The more the mind was enlightened, the more industry was perfected."<sup>50</sup> On the negative side, however, because our misery comes from the disparity between our needs and their fulfilment, "by striving to increase our happiness we change it into wretchedness."<sup>51</sup>

Work thus appears in the interaction of man with his environment for the satisfaction of his needs at the moment when he becomes able to reflect on his accumulated experiences, by comparing the relations of things and deriving certain causal principles, that





is, by forming a certain "sensible reason" out of his potential for self-perfection. And the progress of this work stimulates in man a psychological inclination which is not to be satisfied by a mere preservation. Thus work becomes subject to endless improvements so as to catch up with his growing needs. Let us now turn to the implication of work for the life of the savage man.

THE FIRST REVOLUTION. -- That man in his interaction with environment actualised his potential, developed techniques for his preservation, and thus initiated work as a productive activity, bears an important meaning in that it introduced into the state of nature certain social elements. Rousseau calls this time of dramatic change "the epoch of a first revolution" (l'époque d'une première révolution).<sup>52</sup> In this new stage of enlightenment, characterised by the ability of "comparison", "sensible reason", man began to understand the relationships between things "compared at need."<sup>53</sup> The mental activity that enabled such an understanding was a judgment, a "fonction de critique et de valorisation,"<sup>54</sup> elaborated and completed in contact with an often hostile environment. The understanding which was the result of such mental activities implied, as Goldschmidt indicates,<sup>55</sup> an idea of rivalry, applied initially to other animals and later to those who were similar to himself. It was on this hostile attitude towards other animals and men that the savage man began to base "his superiority" over competitive animals and establish certain terms between him and "those who were similar to" him.



The recognition and establishment of terms with other men were the first symptom of socialisation.

Other men, it is true, were not then to him what they now are to us, and he had no greater intercourse with them than with other animals; yet they were not neglected in his observations. The conformities, which he would in time discover between them, and between him and his female, led him to judge of others which were not then perceptible; and finding that they all behaved as he himself would have done in like circumstances, he naturally inferred that their manner of thinking and acting was altogether in conformity with his own. This important truth, once deeply impressed on his mind, must have induced him, from an intuitive feeling more certain and more rapid than any kind of reasoning, to pursue the rules of conduct, which he had best observed towards them, for his own security and advantage.<sup>56</sup>

Finding that other men "all behaved as he [the savage man] himself would have done in like circumstances", he regarded them at first as beings to compete with. In the original, purely natural state, the savage man was concerned only with his preservation, possessing a sort of amour de soi, which was "the only passion natural to man". This amour de soi did not have "any necessary relation with others; it was in this respect naturally indifferent."<sup>57</sup> How then could the savage man possessing only amour de soi get into connection with others? The mere finding of others did not directly connect him to them because his first response to them was rather evasive and competitive than cooperative.<sup>58</sup>

Rousseau resolves this problem by introducing the notion of "pity", which constitutes, together with amour de soi, the two natural and essential human passions. Pity, however, was not active from the first. "Pity, even though it was natural to the heart of man, remained eternally inactive without imagination which put it into play."<sup>59</sup> It was then the emergence of the faculty of comparison that







enabled man to imagine beyond himself and identify with those who were suffering.<sup>60</sup> When man remained self-sufficient, he did not need to evade others, nor to have any hostility towards them. He could rather show a certain natural benevolence. Goldschmidt explains that it was precisely this absence of any natural relationships that made possible the first conventional relations.<sup>61</sup> However, if pity is defined as an experience of "comparison" towards those who are suffering, and if "suffering" is perceived as the emotion accompanying an inability to fulfill one's needs, a certain material condition has to be presupposed in order to explain the function of pity in bringing men together.

The savage man, who possessed only a passion of amour de soi, was theoretically an independent unit. But this independence was possible only under conditions in which he could by himself fulfill his needs. Either his needs had to be simple enough to be easily fulfilled, or natural resources had to be sufficient enough to satisfy them without effort. When the environment changed and destroyed the self-sufficiency of man, it meant the destruction of this independence; he had therefore either to suffer or to demand help from others. Without environmental change and the resultant gap between desire and achievement no development of the capacity for self-perfection was possible. The first word of men was not "Aimez-moi" but "Aidez-moi."<sup>62</sup> In other words, man needed from other men not sympathy or emotional pity but assistance or material pity. In this sense pity was an extension of amour de soi. Pity made possible coexistence between men and it was this that provided the



ground for bringing natural men into "loose associations" (associations libres) and gave to the passion of pity a certain social significance.

The floating of the passion of pity to the surface of the savage mind reflected the conditions necessary for the development of human work. "Taught by experience that amour de bien-être is the sole motive of human actions", the savage man finally began to distinguish the case in which "common interest might justify him in relying upon the assistance of his fellows."<sup>63</sup> Coexistence bred primitive modes of cooperation or collaboration, and thus pity, an extension of amour de soi, became a social passion.

It was in the process of interacting with the environment that the savage man gathered his fellows into a "herd" (troupeau) or "some kind of loose association" (quelque sorte d'association libre).<sup>64</sup> Such a gathering presupposed a certain level of technical improvement, and forced man to face challenges that he had up to this time avoided.

These first advances enabled men to make others with great rapidity. In proportion as they grew enlightened, they grew industrious. They ceased to fall asleep under the first tree, or in the first cave that afforded them shelter; they invented several kinds of implements of hard and sharp stones, which they used to dig up the earth, and to cut wood; they then made huts out of branches, and afterwards learnt to plaster them over with mud and clay. This was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and distinguished families, and introduced a kind of property, in itself the source of a thousand quarrels and conflicts.<sup>65</sup>

It is notable that Rousseau indicates the time of building "huts" as the "epoch of a first revolution". Building huts meant an end of the "wanderings in the forests" and a life of complete solitude. In





building a hut man committed himself to staying in one place for a comparatively longer time-span, with other human beings with whom he shared mutual assistance. This initial form of society was what Rousseau calls "family", a little society but "the more united because liberty and reciprocal attachment were the only bonds of its union."<sup>66</sup> The family, which developed out of these loose associations, reflected a certain stage in the technical development of the natural state, in which man could secure his natural life by means of coexisting and, to some extent, of cooperating with a limited number of others. It was the "habit of living together" of "husbands and wives, fathers and children, under one roof" that gave rise to "the finest feelings known to humanity, conjugal love and paternal affection", making women become "more sedentary, and accustomed...to mind the hut and their children", and men to go "abroad in search of their common subsistence,"<sup>67</sup> a kind of division of labour within the family.

As long as men remained isolated in their "families", the earlier evasive attitude of the savage man towards other competitive beings still existed. Indeed, the newly attained technical level reinforced such attitudes by necessitating the acquisition of goods and tools, including land. These had to be defended against those who were outside the group: "Every one sought his own private advantage, either by open force, if he thought himself strong enough, or by address and cunning, if he felt himself the weaker."<sup>68</sup> This led to the formation of the first "convention" among men, the "rules of conduct" concerning the primitive notion of property. Though it was destined, ultimately, to become "the source of a thousand quarrels",



this notion of property carried in its early stage a positive meaning because it was still an inseparable means for the fulfilment of the passion of amour de soi and one's self-preservation. The conventions established among men concerning property provided a sort of moral apparatus procuring the peace of "the real youth of the world" (la véritable jeunesse du monde), a peace based on the simplicity of the life of men and the abundance of the resources of nature.

This period, in which a just mean was kept "between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour-propre", was "the happiest and most stable of epochs" and "le genre-humain was meant to remain in it". Man could depart from it "only through some fatal accident, which, for the public good, should never have happened"; "...all the subsequent advances have been apparently so many steps towards the perfection of the individual, but in reality towards the decrepitude of the species."<sup>69</sup> Rousseau's view of this period of the emergence of family and property implies that both family and property ought not to exceed the category of the individual. So long as man's needs were simple enough so that the existing materials could easily satisfy them, "so long as they undertook only what a single person could accomplish, and confined themselves to such arts as did not require the joint labour of several hands", they could still remain in self-sufficiency and did not need to be jealous of others. Thus the natural instinct of amour de soi could be completed by being modified by a "social pity", and human work could enable man to "enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse"<sup>70</sup> in inter-individual, and inter-familial,





relations.

By applying the term "state of nature" to this period of the société naissante rather than to the original, natural state, Rousseau treats human work as a natural activity in meeting one's natural needs for self-preservation. Not only work but also family and property come to bear a certain element of naturalness. This description of the facts of the "natural society" comes into contradiction with Rousseau's hypothesis that the state of nature is opposed to the civil state. Yet it is in this contradiction between hypothesis and fact that Rousseau, as Goldschmidt indicates, establishes "l'état de nature...de manière à faire prévoir et à amener l'état civil,"<sup>71</sup> seeing in the primitive family and property the negative elements of the "perfection of the individual" (la perfection de l'individu)<sup>72</sup> which will, later, characterise the egoism of the civil state. And only in this transitory state of nature can man enjoy completely pleasure in his work.

## 2. Work and the Child

THE CHILD AS SAVAGE. — Rousseau sees in the state of nature men who were free, innocent, and related to each other by "mutual and independent" intercourse. This original man supported his life with primary materials he got through his simple work in nature. As long as his life was simple and frugal, it was not difficult to fulfill the needs of his amour de soi, specified in his amour de bien-être, by



means of his simple work. So he was happy. As long as this man, depending on his hands for the fulfilment of his needs, was self-sufficient, he did not need the help of others, or of any who were outside of his primary social group. Instead of demanding anything from others, this man enjoyed independence and freedom. Moreover, he showed pity, both emotional and material, to those who were suffering. The balance between amour de soi and pity in the individual meant that this slightly advanced civilisation contained certain egalitarian elements. Rousseau finds in this "real youth of the world" a primordial pattern of human life which he develops into a blue-print not only for a new society, but for the natural development of the child into maturity.

Rousseau's notion of the state of nature refers to this second, rather than the first, stage of the "state of nature", that is, the shift from a purely natural state to a relatively civilised state is seen as "progress". Thus the "education of a natural man" must aim at "civilising", or developing the potential faculties of, the child rather than keeping him in a purely natural state. Just as the second stage of the state of nature was bidden welcome because of its "expansion of the human faculties", despite the diminution of man's patience and natural compassion which such faculties brought about, so education is seen as appropriate when it develops his potential faculties even though he may risk losing certain natural characteristics. A child is born "weak...helpless...foolish"; he needs "strength...aid...reason."<sup>73</sup> At the moment of birth the child is purely natural and completely animal, just like the savage man in





the original state of nature was a mere animal. He must be fashioned by education, just like plants are fashioned by cultivation, to have "all that we need when we become grown-up."<sup>74</sup> Thus the paradoxical approach to "nature" in the phylogenic development of the genre-humain, which saw the "state of nature" in the société naissante rather than in the original state of nature, is reflected also in Rousseau's educational plan. In the ontogenic development of the individual "nature" is perceived not as an original unchanging state but as a process of "natural" development.

The concept of "nature" in Rousseau's educational scheme is therefore the "nature of things", that is, the law that governs change. It certainly does not imply a static scene uncontaminated by external influence or inner drives. If the child is born with "organs and faculties", "nature" implies their growth (le développement interne de nos facultés et de nos organes)<sup>75</sup> and its direction. When Rousseau indicates "the goal of nature" as the goal of education, he points to the maturation of those organs and faculties which will bring the child, a purely natural being, to adulthood with faculties developed so that he is able to enjoy an innocent social life. The law that is found in the growth of the child is that which is found in the plant which begins to grow vertically as soon as the artificial shaping frame for horizontal growth is removed. Education, which must obey this law, is to form "habits" that are conformable to it. Everything in education therefore should be brought into harmony with this natural law. Rousseau holds a developmental perspective on childhood, in which "progress" or development bears a primary value.



The development in this case, is in a sense, predetermined by nature. But Rousseau sees development as a "progress" occurring in the interaction of the child with his environment, in the same way that he viewed progress in the state of nature. Whatever the potential faculties may be, it is education, a guided activity of the child, that brings those faculties into actuality. Rousseau's developmental view of childhood starts with an animal-infant and ends with "man", with abilities to be master of his natural environment, rather than one who is subject to it. In other words, the child taught according to Rousseau's educational principles must have established his "superiority" over his natural environment by the time he becomes a "man". This implies, as was the case in the state of nature, the establishment of certain relationships with his fellow men, who also are supposed to be "superior" to other creatures and belong to the "genre-humain". Thus Rousseau's educational scheme is also directed to a socialisation of the child into beings like man in the state of nature which in its established form was a société naissante.

Such a parallel movement in both phylogenic and ontogenic development reflects the methodological opposition of his hypothesis concerning the state of nature and his view of the civil - or civilising - facts. Moreover, it is the basis of Rousseau's concern that education must first of all form the man, and only then transform this "man" into a citoyen.

In the natural order, men being equal to each other, their common vocation was the estate of man [l'état d'homme]; so, man who is well brought up for this vocation cannot be clumsy in fulfilling those works which bring him to this [état d'homme]. It matters little to me whether my pupil is intended for the army, the church, or the law. Before his





parents choose a vocation nature calls him to the human life.  
To live is the occupation I want to have him learn.<sup>76</sup>

Rousseau's "man" is a man of action. Education must begin at the beginning with this man himself. "We begin to learn when we begin to live."<sup>77</sup> Therefore, what is important in education is not the "precepts" of the teacher but the "practice" (exercises) of the child. Leave the child "exposed to all the changes and chances of mortal life"; he must learn through his own activity "to preserve his own life when he is a man, to bear the buffets of fortune, to brave wealth and poverty, to live at need among the snows of Iceland or on the scorching rocks of Malta."<sup>78</sup>

It is in this context that Rousseau begins to elaborate educational prescriptions for the growing child along the "path that nature traces"<sup>79</sup> through "infancy" (enfance), "childhood" (enfance as the second terme de la vie), "preadolescence" (adolescence), and "adolescence" (l'âge nubile), or, as William Boyd characterises them, "the stages" of "animal feeling", "the self-regarding sentiments", "the other-regarding sentiments", and "the idea of happiness and of perfection."<sup>80</sup> Rousseau's educational prescriptions, from the view-point of "self-perfection through activity", are derived from certain elements of the arguments which he applies to his discussion of man's progress in the state of nature. Generally, his prescriptions for the period of infancy contain the elements of his arguments on the purely natural state, while those for the periods of childhood and preadolescence contain aspects of the stages up to the société naissante. The prescription for adolescence, and, in some respects, for preadolescence, contain elements of his conception of a



new egalitarian society, which is opposed to the existing one. Emile, the individual, is then born as an animal-infant, becomes savage by repeating the experience of the species in his life situation, and finally enters society as a citoyen.

EDUCATION THROUGH USEFUL ACTIVITIES: INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD. -- Placed in an isolated natural situation, Emile starts life as an orphan who has neither parents nor siblings. His own nature, the environment in which he is to live now, and the society in which he is to live in the future - these are three basic elements which will determine his growth and his education.

This education comes to us from nature, from men, or from things. The inner growth of our organs and faculties is the education of nature, the use we learn to make of this growth is the education of men, what we gain by our experience of our surroundings is the educataion of things.<sup>81</sup>

As long as society - "men" - is methodologically eliminated in the education of this early childhood, his development or progress will follow the natural direction of growth within himself - "nature" - and the physical environment - "things". Responding to, and by doing so, learning about his environment, and developing his physical faculties, Emile begins to "live", more exactly to "exist".

At birth the child, being in the "state of almost primitive ignorance and stupidity before he has learnt from experience or from his fellows,"<sup>82</sup> has only one sense of physical "pain and suffering" for his instinctual self-preservation, duplicating the initial state of the animal man in the purely natural state. Like the baby of any





sentient beast Emile shows instinctual responses to the stimuli from environment. Weak in bodily strength and undeveloped in sensation, the infant must be allowed "to stir and stretch his limbs" freely and be exposed to various external stimuli so as to enhance bodily and sensual development. Through such free movements he grows physically and begins to have an "idea of space,"<sup>83</sup> the idea of what is "me" and what is "not-me"; in other words, he comes to differentiate himself from his environment. This is the beginning of his interaction with his environment. Up to this time, physical growth being the almost sole task of development, the role of the nurse has been more important than that of the tutor.

When the child begins to talk, however, education becomes more demanding. In infancy the child's response to external stimuli are - be it movement or crying - "purely mechanical effects, without any knowledge or will."<sup>84</sup> Depending on others for his preservation and for the satisfaction of his natural needs, the child calls them for help by means of such "mechanical" activities as crying, and lets them know his satisfaction by his smile or vigorous bodily movements. To this extent, such initial activities are in service of preserving the life of the child; nevertheless, they are essentially mere reflex responses to the physical conditions and have no intentions or purposes. The child is not aware of what he is doing; he merely "senses" what is going on within and outside himself and responds automatically. This kind of activity is exactly the same as that of the man of animality whom Rousseau presumed to have existed in the original, natural state. Both the infant and the savage man are



subject to the necessity of nature. But with the emergence of language the child enters a new stage of childhood, replacing instinctual crying with more effective means of communication with his patrons. Though inarticulate, the language of early childhood - Rousseau calls this a "natural language"<sup>85</sup> - is "accentuated, toned, intelligible" and provides evidence of his already deep involvement in his surroundings, which is widened by the new ability of walking. It is at this moment that Rousseau's educational doctrine is expatiated in terms of the relation of the child and his environment.

For Rousseau "man's proper learning" (l'étude convenable à l'homme)<sup>86</sup> is the learning of "his relation to his environment": "So long as he only knows that environment through his physical nature, he should study himself in relation to things; that is the business of his childhood."<sup>87</sup> So Rousseau attempts in this second stage of life to implant certain habits of dealing with the environment.

At first the child is to have no artificial habits. His natural, that is, instinctual, needs must be expressed and satisfied. The child must be asked neither to sit still when he wants to run about, nor to run when he wants to be quiet. He must be allowed to run, to jump, and to shout to his heart's content. All these activities are "instincts of the body for its growth in strength."<sup>88</sup> The child must be allowed, and even encouraged, to meet such "natural" needs by himself. The task of the tutor in this connection is to differentiate what is "artificial" from what is "natural", that is, "the needs of budding caprice" from "the needs which spring from the





overflowing life."<sup>89</sup> However, such a permissive policy of the tutor does not secure a complete freedom for the child. Just as the savage man suffered comparative weakness in relation to his environment, so too the child's freedom is "restricted" by his lack of strength. Insofar as his bodily and mental powers are too weak to meet, without the help from others, his needs, the child is naturally destined to suffer the disparity between his needs and their satisfaction. Though a large part of what he needs, such as food, clothes, house, etc., is provided by "the help of others", a pedagogical principle is adopted to train the child, step by step, so that he may ultimately be able to meet his needs by his own power alone.

The essence of this pedagogical principle is to keep the child in self-sufficiency. Although the young child cannot solve all the problems by himself, he may be able to solve some of them in certain areas: for example, he may be able to put on his clothes instead of asking others to do it. So the first step in the education for self-sufficiency consists in subjugating the child's desires, if they are not related to the preservation itself, to his ability to satisfy them. Practically, however, all the child's desires in infancy fall within the boundaries of preservation. By satisfying as soon as possible his basic needs by himself, the child will feel the freedom that comes from the fulfilment of needs. On the other hand, the restriction of the child's desires must not be accomplished artificially but "naturally". If the child is forced by the tutor to restrict his desires, such an over-severity will only make him wretched, and this is contrary to the principle that the child has to



be happy. So Rousseau advises that the child's desires be limited to those which involve him in an actual relationship to things. This means that the child's "unreasonable wishes...meet physical obstacles only [and] the punishment which results from his own actions."<sup>90</sup>

Treat your scholar according to his age. Put him in his place from the first, and keep him in it, so that he no longer tries to leave it. Then before he knows what goodness is, he will be practicing his chief lesson...Let him only know that he is weak and you are strong, that his condition and yours put him at your mercy; let this be perceived, learned, and felt. Let him early find upon his proud neck, the heavy yoke which nature has imposed upon us, the heavy yoke of necessity, under which every finite being must bow.<sup>91</sup>

Being put "in his place", the child "bears patiently with the nature of things,"<sup>92</sup> adapts himself to this situation, fulfilling, as best he can, his needs with his given strength, and gives up those needs which are beyond his reach and which others refuse to satisfy, like the savage man who "when self-preservation is no longer possible...resigns himself to his fate and dies without vain torments."<sup>93</sup>

The subjection of the child to the necessity of nature is established in order to check any amour-propre which originates from the satisfaction of needs by over-indulgent adults. For although the child is weak, his desires will increase rapidly enough to breed amour-propre if they are easily fulfilled by the help of others. The effect of this growing amour-propre is the stubbornness and egoistic inclinations in many children in contemporary society.

Man naturally considers all that he can get as his own. In this sense Hobbes' theory is true to a certain extent: Multiply both our wishes and the means of satisfying them, and each will be master of all. Thus the child, who has only to ask and have, thinks himself the master of the universe; he considers all men as his slaves; and when you are at last compelled to refuse, he takes your refusal as an act of rebellion, for he thinks he has only to command.<sup>93</sup>







In order to check this egoistic inclination, which succeeds the innocent period of infancy, Rousseau attempts to control imagination, which gives rise to amour-propre, by placing the children in a "real" relationship with things, one in which he can fulfill his "natural" needs while being confronted with the external and actual conditions of "nature". At first the fulfilment of his needs may appear to be completely subject to chance because theoretically he is unaware of what is going on in the external world. But accumulated experiences and the repeated relevance of his responses sooner or later form simple ideas, and by reflecting on these simple ideas he develops a certain intellectual ability, "raison sensible". It is at this point that the child begins to purposefully utilise physical forces for what he sees as desirable or good for his preservation.

Just as the savage man (with his new enlightenment) began to utilise materials at hand for his preservation, the child, with the emergence of "raison sensible", is able, if guided, to utilise external as well as internal physical forces in order to satisfy his needs by himself. The notion of "utility", which Rousseau introduces as the criterion of the application of a child's activity in this second period of primitive reason in childhood, leads the child to initiate and to perform actions which are necessary for fulfilling his natural needs, and to avoid those which are not. In other words, with the notion of utility as the criterion of his actions the child is able, first, to restrict his activities intentionally to what is good and useful to his preservation and welfare, and, second, to avoid the danger of falling into the egoism which a blind desire for



gratification is apt to inspire.<sup>94</sup> The notion of utility is then advanced as a new educational measure, a principle by which the child is to be subjugated to the necessity of nature. It is to be complemented by the child's "rational" control of his own activity. Generally speaking, the activities undertaken under the criterion of utility contain a certain quality of work in the sense that they are guided by a purpose and produce results which are useful and "good" for life. Because of the child's still immature physical and mental condition, however, these "useful" activities will not yet, in the second stage of childhood, produce useful goods to be consumed both by the child himself and by others. Rather, Rousseau focusses on the effects of such activities on the proper mental and physical growth of the child. This useful activity, "slow and laborious,"<sup>95</sup> demands a total engagement of the child in his activity and is characteristic in that it demands not only mental but also physical employment. In Rousseau's conception, mental activity is not a separate domain from the physical one.

Man's powers are stirred by the same instinct. The bodily activity, which seeks an outlet for its energies, is succeeded by the mental activity which seeks for knowledge. Children are first restless, then curious; and this curiosity, rightly directed, is the means of development for the age with which we are dealing.<sup>96</sup>

Utilising intellectual "curiosity" as "the means of development" in this second stage of childhood, Rousseau guides the activity of the child not to production but to an understanding of the relationships of things in life situations.

The child being isolated from society, his curiosity is naturally destined to focus primarily on his relation with the





external world, that is, with things. He acts upon things, and things receive his action: "A child never attacks people, only things... Things, however, do not defend themselves."<sup>97</sup> So the relation is basically that of domination, of ownership. For this reason, the education of Emile leads him in childhood to a primitive notion of "justice" concerning "what is due to me". The "justice" of this stage, corresponding to the child's emerging pity as a social passion, bears by nature a social character. This notion of "le Mien, le Tien" is, though in a primitive form, the notion of "property". Being led to understanding property as the right of the first occupier established by his work, the child views it as the basis of an activity for preservation and welfare, and is reminded that "every one respects other people's work so that his own may be safe."<sup>98</sup> This primitive notion of property gives the child a sort of moral conception of justice which enables him to coexist in "free and independent" mutual intercourse, with other human beings. In order to provide an opportunity for Emile to learn this "moral lesson", Rousseau provides him with a kind of garden work. But Emile is too weak both physically and mentally to complete the work and is assisted by the tutor; it is thus not a productive work in its proper sense. Rather, Rousseau's intention in introducing this experience seems to lie in stimulating and developing the child's understanding of the relationships of things through engaging him in useful activities. These activities establish, at least conceptually, the dominant position of man over his environment and an egalitarian relationship between individual men. There is no doubt that the educational prescriptions for this last stage of childhood are modeled on



Rousseau's ideas concerning the second stage of the state of nature.

Generally, Rousseau's educational prescription for the period from infancy up to the end of childhood is a recapitulation of the process by which the man of animality transformed himself to a man of the savage society. The child emerges from the primitive "ignorance and stupidity" of infancy and through his interaction with his environment perceives and utilises the conditions of the environment in order to fulfill his needs. The activities of the child, which began merely as a "mechanical" response to external stimuli, come to be controlled by his emerging reason in order to achieve a useful and "good" result. Thus before the onset of preadolescence, Emile, though he does not produce goods for himself or for others, decorates his room, invents primitive tools as his activity, fulfills his growing curiosity and experiences a sort of real work, though assisted by his tutor, in gardening. He is, of course, still dependent on others for his food, his clothes, his shelter. In this sense, at the close of childhood, the child arrives at a point where in a limited area, he can sustain an independent and free life, one similar to the savage of the société naissante who supported his "independent and free" life with the primary materials he got through his simple work in nature. The development of the ability to act upon things according to the principle of "utility" is finally capped with a primitive notion of justice concerning "le Mien, le Tien", which enables the child to establish a social relation with others on equal terms. It is on the basis of such progress in useful activities that the child is prepared for the learning of real work, an occupation by which he may qualify





himself as a fully independent individual, at least in his ability to preserve himself.

WORK INTRODUCED: PREADOLESCENCE(1). -- By the time work is introduced in preadolescence, the child has fulfilled certain preconditions. First, he has acquired enough physical strength to start productive work. Even though he is not yet mature, his physical strength is now greater than his needs which are even less developed. As Rousseau puts it, "He would be a feeble man, but he is a strong child."<sup>99</sup> When the child's strength exceeds his needs, he possesses a surplus strength. Just as the man in the civilising process paid attention to the future when his work produced more than he needed, the child in preadolescence also "casts his present surplus into the storehouse of the future,"<sup>100</sup> namely into his "head" and his "hands". Second, the development in intelligence, stimulated by his engagement in useful activities and growing curiosity, enables the child to discern "what is good for him" and "what is not", and to understand "what constitutes his well-being". He is then able to distinguish "work" from "play". What is really "useful" must be something that serves to procure what is necessary using a future perspective rather than an instantaneous ratification of instinctual needs. Thus play is devalued as a mere "relaxation,"<sup>101</sup> and work remains the only truly "useful" activity.

The principal aim in introducing work into education is to prepare "useful" skills ("the hands") for a future life which is to be



"independent and free". As the first condition for such a life is the preservation of oneself, the child, when grown up, has to know how to support himself, how to earn his food, however circumstance may change. Work skills are taught because they are the most reliable means of ensuring that Emile will be able to maintain himself in his future life. Fortune, high social position and other privileges, which some men enjoy in the existing society, are all subject to change; once revolution comes (and Rousseau perceived it as unavoidable) and "the great becomes small, the rich poor, the king a commoner,"<sup>102</sup> all these social advantages will be completely nullified. So the safest way to prepare the child for the future is "to raise him to the status of man,"<sup>103</sup> in which everyone preserves himself by his own work. It is in this context that Rousseau insists that the poor do not need this aspect of "education". Being already without wealth and having almost no chance of social promotion, the poor are already doing the work imposed on them by destiny, in order to preserve themselves. They will survive as long as their physical strength is maintained. Emile, chosen "among the rich", learns how to work and then equips himself with an ability by which he will keep himself from dependence on others.

Let rogues conduct the affairs of state; in your lowly rank you can still be an honest man and get a living. You walk into the first workshop of your trade. "Master, I want work." "Commrade, take your place and work". Before dinner-time you have earned your dinner. If you are sober and industrious, before the week is out you will have earned your keep for another week; you will have lived in freedom, health, truth, industry, and righteousness.<sup>104</sup>

Such purposes determine the criteria for selecting appropriate work ("the particular trade"), to be taught to the child. As a





general criterion for the evaluation of different works, Rousseau adopts how "useful" and "necessary" they are for life, and how little help they demand from others:

...the art which is most generally useful and necessary, is undoubtedly that which most deserves esteem, and that art which requires the least help from others, is more worthy of honour than those which are dependent on other arts, since it is freer and more nearly independent.<sup>105</sup>

Therefore, warning against vulgar prejudices, Rousseau recommends manual work (travail manuel), work that anyone who has hands can perform, and "the nearest to a state of nature" among "all the pursuits by which a man may earn his living."<sup>106</sup> There are several other criteria for the selection of an appropriate trade. First, the work has to be suitable to the child's sex, and, for children, to their age. For example, "sedentary indoor employments" are not suitable to boy because such works make the body "tender and effeminate."<sup>109</sup> Second, unhealthy work is to be avoided. The work the pupil learns must enhance, rather than hinder, proper physical growth. However, this does not mean that "difficult or dangerous" work is not suitable; indeed such work is preferable because it will require the pupil to exercise himself "in strength and courage."<sup>108</sup> Third, work which is likely to develop detestable qualities in the pupil's mind must be excluded because such qualities are "incompatible with humanity."<sup>109</sup> Unfortunately, Rousseau gives no example of such work. All these criteria reflect the basic concept of work; that by giving one the means to employ appropriately one's faculties, it is the surest means to preserve one's independent and free life.

Referring to these criteria, Rousseau selects the work of



carpenter as the most suitable "trade" for Emile. It is clean, useful, easy to carry on at home, gives adequate exercise, calls for skill and industry, produces goods with elegance and taste.<sup>110</sup> Carpentry, in short, deserves the pupil's "time...labour...trouble" and his "self."<sup>111</sup> In carpentry Emile is to acquire "sufficient skills...to rival the speed, the familiarity, and the diligence of good workmen."<sup>112</sup> It is thus acquired namely as a sort of specialised skill. As an ideal, Emile is expected to generalise and apply the skills acquired to other kinds of work.

He is ready for anything. He can handle the spade and hoe, he can use the lathe, hammer, plane, or file; he is already familiar with these tools which are common to many trades...Moreover his senses are acute and well-practiced, he knows the principles of the various trades; to work like a master of his craft he only needs experience, and experience comes from practice.<sup>113</sup>

Such generalised skills provide a wider adaptability to future circumstances. Thus the scope of instruction in work must be wide and each skill must be taught in depth:

While you take him from one workshop to another, let him try his hand at every trade you show him, and do not leave it till he has thoroughly learnt why everything is done so, or at least everything that has attracted his attention.<sup>114</sup>

Such an emphasis upon the thoroughness of learning work skills is underpinned by a belief in the positive effect of a manual occupation, which goes beyond a mere acquisition of technical skills. The intentional and purposeful exercise of the body that such work activity demands arouses unconsciously "thought and reflection" in the pupil's mind. It thus counteracts mental idleness which would result in an unhealthy use of the imagination and help liberate man from his passions.<sup>115</sup> Intellectual curiosity is not a purely mental phenomenon





but strongly connected with bodily activity which seeks an "outlet for its energies."<sup>116</sup> It is, in truth, an "endless search for fresh means" of satisfying one's innate desire for comfort,<sup>117</sup> and calls forth mental elaborations which apply to the physical work itself. A pendulum-like movement this takes place between the two poles, physical and mental. Undertaken in an actual productive situation, the work of the pupil brings him to an understanding of the working relationships of things, encourages the formation of a rational ability to derive causes out of results, and thus elevates him to the status of a rational being. Work makes the pupil think like a philosopher while he works like a peasant. The introduction of work into the education of the preadolescent implies the completion of a natural man who is fully capable of procuring the necessary materials for his well-being while maintaining a sense of moral justice and rational judgment in his relationship with other men in "mutual and independent" intercourse.

We have examined the preconditions for instruction in work skills in preadolescence, their purposes, their scope and depth, and the effect which they will have upon the development of the pupil. Let us now turn to the pedagogical process by which work is introduced and developed. In Rousseau's educational scheme, work is introduced as a preparation for the future in a line that starts with the concept of necessity in infancy, passes through that of "utility" in childhood and culminates in a new educational conception of the activity of the child for fulfilling his needs in future actual life situations. At first the child was placed in, and encouraged to act



upon, his environment according to the necessity of nature. With the appearance of "raison sensible" he was guided to control his actions as well as his passions, according to a consciously formulated criterion of utility. These useful activities give rise, at the beginning of preadolescence, to a primitive notion that the truly useful activity is not "play", which is a "relaxation", but "work", which is production. Work is introduced in preadolescence in order to prepare a useful "hand" together with a useful "head" for the future by utilising the surplus strength characteristic of this period. Thus both the skill and knowledge to be attained are charged with practical value. Such an education, being possible only in an actual life situation, presupposes a continuation of the method which is grounded on activity initiated by the child himself. This means that the activity by which the pupil learns his work or trade should be undertaken in order to fulfill his needs by his own effort. Therefore, despite the fact that the learning of work is by definition for the future, it must be motivated by the need and curiosity of the present and be applied to use whenever needed.

A dramatic example of how learning of appropriate work skills might occur is described in Book III of the Emile. The tutor makes a present of the Book Robinson Crusoe to Emile, who has been brought up in a controlled country environment. Rousseau expects Emile to identify with the hero and to occupy himself with his own "castle", his own "goals", his own "plantations".

Let him learn in detail, not from books but from things, all that is necessary in such a case. Let him think he is Robinson himself; let him see himself clad in skins, wearing a tall cap, a great cutlass, all the grotesque get-up of





Robinson Crusoe...He should anxiously consider what steps to take; will this or that be wanting. He should examine his hero's conduct; has he omitted nothing; is there nothing he could have done better? He should carefully note his mistakes, so as not to fall into them himself in similar circumstances, for you may be sure he will plan out such a settlement for himself.<sup>118</sup>

In this imaginary situation, which is actually the same as that in which Emile is placed, Emile elaborates by himself the necessary measures for solving conceived problems, and assesses critically the hero's conduct. Whether or not a thirteen-year-old would be able, actually, to survive in such an absolutely deprived situation is not at issue; what is important is that his contacts with the environment are perceived by him to be similar to those of Robinson Crusoe. First of all, Emile must form appropriate judgment about Crusoe's situation and, from this, infer what is necessary, that is, what is useful and what is appropriate for the problem-solution; in other words, he must think and reason. Second, he must possess the ability to change external conditions in order to fit them to his own use; in other words, he must work with his hands. This ability, both mental and physical, to survive in a solitary situation, is to be acquired in the first stage of the education in preadolescence through various self-directed activities of the pupil. Investigating the setting and rising of the sun, Emile finds out by himself a number of astronomical and geometrical relationships; at a fair he uncovers the secrets of the conjuror's duck and demonstrates what the conjuror did, this time by himself; being lost in the forest of Montmorency, suffering hunger and thirst, he discovers the way out, again by himself. These activities provide Emile with well developed abilities in the "natural arts" (arts naturels).<sup>119</sup>



The "natural arts" are characterised by their being practiced by a single man without appealing to the help of others. Still unspecified and unspecialised as a "trade", they are so simple that they do not require any sophisticated skill or knowledge. They are, however, good enough to provide for the child, as well as the savage, when he "knows no other happiness but food and freedom."<sup>120</sup> Strictly speaking, the recapitulation of the phylogenic progress from the original, natural state to the société naissante in the learning of work skills in preadolescence closes with the acquisition of abilities in these arts. However, insofar as the child is born in society and must return to a social life, and inasmuch as the work in the existing society is divided into many sub-divisions, making dependence on others inevitable, such a simple and single-handed mode of production is not enough to support an individual. In order to secure an "independent and free" life for the future the pupil has to learn certain specialised arts that are useful and valuable in the present society. Without mastering at least one of these arts one's preservation in society cannot be guaranteed. Thus the pupil must move from the "natural arts" to the "industrial arts" (arts d'industrie), which require the "cooperation of many hands."<sup>121</sup>

It is in this second stage of preadolescence that Emile, by learning "industrial arts", acquires an ability to preserve himself in the future. He thus attains a condition in which he enjoys a similar status to that which the "independent and free" savage sustained in the second stage of the state of nature. Thus, the education of the individual, natural man is completed and at this point the process





leading to the âge d'or of the state of nature has been fully recapitulated. The industrial arts, however, imply the existence of a division of labour and, therefore, the interdependence of men. They thus unavoidably are linked to the possibility of inequality and injustice. Any instruction in these arts must therefore be provided with great deliberation and caution. A satisfactory discussion of this instruction will be undertaken in the next chapter in which the process of the fall from the state of nature and the origin of the evils of the civil state will be examined.



## NOTES

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12 Ibid., p. 160; SC/E, pp. 203-4. Partially retranslated. My emphasis.

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16 Emile, OC, IV, p. 550; EM/E p. 217.

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- 48 Emile, OC, IV, p. 305; EM/E, p. 45.
- 49 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 166; SC/E, p. 209.
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- 52 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 167
- 53 Ibid., p. 165.
- 54 Goldschmidt, V., op. cit., p. 411.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 166; SC/E, p. 209.
- 57 Emile, OC, III, p. 322; EM/E, p. 56. Partially retranslated.
- 58 L'Origine des Langues, op. cit., p. 122.
- 59 Ibid., p. 121.
- 60 That pity is derived from comparison is also shown in Rousseau's three maxims concerning pity: 1. "Il n'est pas dans le coeur humain de se mettre à la place des gens qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais seulement de ceux qui sont plus à plaindre." (Emile, OC, IV, p. 506) 2. "On ne plaint jamais dans autrui que les maux dont on ne se croit pas exempt soi-même." (p. 507) 3. "La pitié qu'on a du mal d'autrui ne se mesure pas sur la quantité de ce mal, mais sur le sentiment qu'on prête à ceux qui le souffrent." (p. 508)
- 61 Goldschmidt, V., op. cit., p. 413.
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- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Ibid., p. 167; SC/E, p. 210.





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108 Ibid.

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### CHAPTER THREE:

#### Work, the Civil State, and the Socialisation of a Child

##### 1. Work and the Civil State

FAMILY AND PROPERTY. -- "The savage" (le sauvage),<sup>1</sup> a very different being from "the savage man" (l'homme sauvage), existed in an emerging society and in a changing situation. These changes in the original natural state were generated by the technical progress which man created when he could no longer solve problems he faced. Other men, who had up to this time been roving in the forest, joined him and formed herds or "loose associations", and eventually families.

The initial families were merely an extension of "loose associations". Each member of a family was "free", and the "reciprocal attachment" that tied the members was physical rather than emotional. At the early stages of the development of the family, "there had been marriages, but there had never been love."<sup>2</sup> One family member might begin to dig a well and another finish it, without any "collaboration", or, indeed, without being seen by the first one.<sup>3</sup> Consequently his work in the family was cooperative in the sense that





it was directed to a common cause, that is, the preservation of each other; originally, however, such a cooperation, or "mutual assistance", was an habitual rather than a planned or controlled activity by family members on the basis of rational calculation or intentional, purposeful "accord" between them. Each member of the family stayed within the family simply because it was convenient and he or she was used to it. In spite of the looseness in organisation, however, the family was to outsiders an impenetrable whole: "Each family was sufficient to itself, and perpetuated itself through intermarriage."<sup>4</sup> Men in this early stage were "isolated in their families, without any communication"<sup>5</sup> with other families. By the members of a family strangers were perceived in the same way as other competitive animals. Such a total separation of family from family implied a rather hostile and competitive attitude alongside the indifference which came from the lack of intercourse. Being ignorant of the aliens, their first instinctual response to them was to protect what they had obtained within the family.

Such a peculiar situation of the initial family provides useful clues to explain the nature of relationships both within and outside the family. Within the family the habit of "living together" and confronting external challenges together enabled members to form a certain emotional solidarity in "conjugal love" and "paternal affection". These emotional ties, combined with common economic activity, resulted in the emergence of the consciousness of common ownership, and on this ground the development of an intra-familial division of labour, minding "the hut and their children" being women's



job and going "abroad in search of their common subsistence" men's task. So the family in the "natural society", or the société naissante, was established as an extension of the individual self, just as the "love" within the family, an advanced form of "pity", is an extension of amour de soi. Man became tied by emotional affections and certain feelings of common destiny; nevertheless, he still remained "free". So in Rousseau's conception no contradiction is presumed to have existed in the natural family between the individual member and the family as a whole. Family is perceived rather as something that completed the individual in an enlightened situation, securing his preservation by common efforts and complementing what is absent in one sex with what is present in another sex.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that with the establishment of family a sort of property is introduced. However, the family did not lead directly to the convention of property. In Rousseau's conception, particularly in the Essai sur l'Origine des Langues, the family is regarded as something natural rather than a post-natural social institution: "In the early ages [thinks Rousseau] men, scattered on the surface of the earth, had no society but that of family, no laws but that of nature, no language but that of gesture and certain inarticulate sounds."<sup>6</sup> By definition, property is an exclusive "right" over certain valuable things, and such a "legality" was formed only when property as an object was defended, not by physical force, but by a "convention" among men and among different families. In order for property to appear, therefore, the natural family had to have permanent relations with other families. How then





were such "civil" relations introduced between the competing families?

In order to explain this, Rousseau once again refers to changes in the nature of the work activities of men. The environment sometimes changed so dramatically that the life of men was severely threatened by such "accidents" as floods, earthquakes, storms, the seasons. In the original natural state, men had to accept such changes, dying of hunger, thirst and fire. But with the "enlightenment", which man had attained through his previous responses to the environment, he now tried to overcome these natural disasters by collaborating with his fellow men. Such an attempt, already getting beyond the capacity of a single family, inevitably transformed strangers into neighbours, and, by the time man began to build his semi-permanent dwellings, he had already come out of the forest, formed primitive communities, and developed "popular languages" which were to replace "domestic languages."<sup>7</sup>

...Men, who had up to now been roving in the woods, by taking to a more settled manner of life, come gradually together, form separate bodies, and at length in every country arises a distinct nation, united in character and manners, not by regulations or laws, but by uniformity of life and food, and the common influence of climate. Permanent neighbourhood could not fail to produce, in time, some connection between different families.<sup>8</sup>

The formation of neighbourhood by the need for collaboration meant, on the one hand, an extension of the coexistent mode of life within the family to a community level, establishing certain permanent relations between families, and, on the other hand, the consolidation of the family into an individual, private domain.

Psychologically, the new life in a permanent, or



semi-permanent, relationship with outsiders provided abundant opportunities for man to compare himself with others. This, in time, led to a social pity and to love, "a sentiment tender and sweet,"<sup>9</sup> giving rise to the ideas of beauty and merit and to the feeling of preference. On the other hand, the new concept of neighbourhood aroused in the savage the passions of "vanity and contempt" as well as "shame and envy."<sup>10</sup> These passions, characterised by the term amour-propre, arise when man compares himself with others, while the passion of amour de soi is concerned solely with self-sufficiency: "Comparing self with others, amour-propre is never satisfied and never can be."<sup>11</sup> Being unable to be content with mere preservation, amour-propre demanded the savage place himself in a better position, be superior to, have more, to enjoy more than, others. This "relative" and artificial sentiment, being in conflict with pity, fermented a new situation which was to be solved by a primitive social measure.

As the "private connections" of the savage "became every day more intimate", and as the limit of inter-familial relationship became extended, a certain settlement of conflicting passions had to be made, at least at the community level. This was possible only with the evolution of "reason" or "morality".

As soon as men began to value one another, and the idea of consideration had got a footing in the mind, every one put in his claim to it, and it became impossible to refuse it to any with impunity. Hence arose the first obligations of civility even among savages; and every intended injury became an affront; because, besides the hurt which might result from it, the party injured was certain to find in it a contempt for his person, which was often more insupportable than the hurt itself...





Thus, as every man punished the contempt shown him by others, in proportion to his opinion of himself, revenge became terrible, and men bloody and cruel...<sup>12</sup>

Affront and revenge were the basis of the first "morality", peculiar to the savage who, still "equally confined by instinct and reason to the sole care of guarding himself against the mischiefs which threatened him", regarded physical force as the unique means of solving conflicts.

...Morality began to appear in human actions, and every one, before the institution of law, was the only judge and avenger of the injuries done him, so that the goodness which was suitable in the pure state of nature was no longer proper in the new born state of society [société naissante]. Punishments had to be made more severe, as opportunities of offending became more frequent, and the dread of vengeance had to take the place of the rigour of the law.<sup>13</sup>

It was at the time when physical forces were subsumed under the new notion of morality that "le Mien" became socially distinguished from "le Tien".

Regarding the origin of property, Rousseau holds two seemingly contradictory views. At the beginning of the "Second Part" of the Inégalité, Rousseau says: "The first person who, having fenced off a plot of ground, took it into his head to say this is mine and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society."<sup>14</sup> This is a "first occupier" theory. The notion of property as the right of the first occupier is also held in the Contrat Social in an exposition of the necessary conditions for a proper proprietorship.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, in the same Inégalité Rousseau affirms another theory of property as the right over the product of one's work.

This origin is so much the more natural, as it is impossible



to conceive how property can come from anything but manual labour: for what else can a man add to things which he does not originally create, so as to make them his own property? It is the husbandman's labour alone that, giving him a title to the produce of the ground he has tilled, gives him a claim also to the land itself, at least till harvest; and so, from year to year, a constant possession which is easily transformed into property.<sup>16</sup>

The "first occupier" theory, being consonant with the Lockean view of property as a donation by God to all men, lays emphasis on the natural aspect of the property. Man may occupy ground and sow seed; but it is not man but nature that provides the ground and makes the seed grow and bear fruit. The land itself belongs to no particular person, but to men in common. So, "property" as an "occupation" is justifiable, only when "the Fruits of the Earth" produced by an individual's property are the "peculiar part" necessary for his preservation.<sup>17</sup> Rousseau seems to have used this theory on the one hand to criticise the existing, avaricious property system, and, on the other, to describe the nature of initial "morality" which was generally the "law of strongest".

However, if the existence of property is to be accounted for as a convention among different persons, mere occupation will not serve to explain its origin, particularly in the age of reason. In order to legitimately claim a plot of land as his property man had to have put something into it, and this was, Rousseau thinks, his labour. If history is perceived hypothetically as a process of degradation from a purely natural state to a man-made social state, and if property is presumed to have appeared in a société naissante, not at once, but in the series of conflicts between different interests, the two theories of the origin of property may be understood as successive





phases in the development of the concept of property rather than as contradictory theories. At first property came about because of the occupation of land; however, it later appeared as a fruit of one's labour. This implies that the concept of property was an historical phenomenon, a consequence of foregoing developments. With the concept of property as the fruit of one's labour, the right of the first occupier is legitimised; meanwhile, it is this labour-fruit theory that restricts the occupation of land to an amount by which one can preserve himself by working on it. This is the positive aspect of property which Rousseau sees in the "natural society".

In the newly emerged community, man began to claim exclusive rights over certain things under his occupation, and people began to accept and approve this. The result was a sort of social "convention". The role of physical force in achieving such a convention is explained in the following quote:

As, however, the strongest were probably the first to build themselves huts which they felt themselves able to defend, it may be concluded that the weak found it much easier and safer to imitate, than to attempt to dislodge them: and of those who were once provided huts, none could have any inducement to appropriate that of his neighbour; not indeed so much because it did not belong to him, as because it could be of no use, and he could not make himself master of it without exposing himself to a desperate battle with the family which occupied it.<sup>18</sup>

The conflicts over private interests multiplied affronts and revenges, making men less patient and diminishing their natural compassion.<sup>19</sup> The emergence of property as a convention to be respected by all implied a truce to the hostile relations of men which were aroused by amour-propre, and only by this measure could men satisfy their amour de soi in a civil situation.



Generally speaking, the establishments of family and property were the external phenomena of the socialisation that the increasing productivity of human work necessitated. That man came out of the forests and began to settle in a permanent, or semi-permanent, dwelling meant that he began to add to hunting and fishing, animal-breeding and a sort of gardening. That the concept of property appeared in this new phase of the development of work is reflected in Rousseau's view that the initial form of property was "lands and cattle."<sup>20</sup> Such new works were pregnant with the possibility of a rapid increase of productivity, which would soon destroy the essential precondition for maintaining "natural society" - that the savage undertake "only what a single person could accomplish" - by necessitating the "joint labour of several hands."<sup>21</sup> In this sense the peace of the second stage of the state of nature was temporary and transitional.

THE GREAT REVOLUTION. -- The most crucial development in bringing the state of nature to an end was, according to Rousseau, the introduction of two arts, agriculture and metallurgy. Rousseau calls the tremendous change brought about by these arts a "great revolution" (grande révolution). The historical significance of these arts was profound.

First, the introduction of agriculture and metallurgy brought about tremendous technical advances in the work of men. In the theoretical picture of the second stage of the state of nature - the





"natural society" - the production of the savage was only sufficient to enable him to fulfill his immediate needs. Thanks to his work, he was able to enjoy his leisure and make "play" an "occupation" of men and women.<sup>23</sup> Being concerned with "present and apparent interest", the savages were "perfect strangers to foresight, and were so far from troubling themselves about a distant future, that they hardly thought of the morrow."<sup>24</sup> Agricultural activity, however, requires a "consent to immediate loss, in order to reap a future gain - a precaution very foreign to the turn of a savage's mind."<sup>25</sup> Such "uncommon courage and foresight, to undertake so laborious a work, with so distant a prospect of drawing advantage from it"<sup>26</sup> was an important psychological change in man, one necessary for agriculture to appear.

Second, the advance in the work of men represented by agriculture saw the introduction of a "division of labour", a new form of industry.

The invention of the other arts must therefore have been necessary to compel mankind to apply themselves to agriculture. No sooner were artificers wanted to smelt and forge iron, than others were required to maintain them; the more hands were employed in manufactures, the fewer were left to provide for the common subsistence, though the number of mouths to be furnished with food remained the same: and some required commodities in exchange for their iron, the rest at length discovered the method of making iron serve for the multiplication of commodities. By this means the arts of husbandry and agriculture were established on the one hand, and the art of working metals and multiplying their uses on the other.<sup>27</sup>

Compared with the existing mode of life in the "natural society", where men were self-sufficient within their families, this new phase of human work was revolutionary in that it demanded a general inter-dependence among men. The peasant needed extra amounts of



"wheat" so that he might get, by exchange, "iron" and other goods which he did not produce. Only by having "enough provisions for two", instead of one, could he feed his amour-propre. This meant that work was now a social activity rather than a domestic, individual one.

Third, the division of labour awakened men to the necessity of producing as much as possible and made property the concern of the whole society. Under the new conditions of the division of labour, the more one produced, the more one could claim by means of exchange. Work now became man's primary activity, "play" becoming a useless pastime, and "vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow."<sup>28</sup> But in order to produce more, it was necessary to own the means for more production.

...the strongest did more work; the most skillful turned his work to best account; the most ingenious devised methods of diminishing his work; the peasant had more need for iron, or the smith for wheat; and, while both working equally, one man earned too much and another man scarcely enough to support his living.<sup>29</sup>

In this competition for the means to produce more, property thus became metamorphosed from a means of self-sufficiency to an essential for endless accumulation.

Fourth, the need for more goods was accelerated by new psychological demands:

Behold then all human faculties developed, memory and imagination in full play, amour-propre interested, reason active, and the mind almost at the highest point of its perfection. Behold all the natural qualities in action, the rank and condition of every man assigned him; not merely his share of property and his power to serve or injure others, but also his wit, beauty, strength or skill, merit or talents: and these being the only qualities capable of commanding respect, it soon became necessary to possess or to affect







them.<sup>30</sup>

It was in this "third and last stage" that amour-propre became to prevail in the mind of man.<sup>31</sup> The effect of this was to lead man to demean himself to a selfish animal and became a slave to his vanity. On the one hand, "to be" was no longer the same as "to seem to be". Concealing his selfish ambition, man behaved as if he were benevolent. In order to pursue his selfish interest, man

...must have been sly and artful in his behaviour to some, and imperious and cruel to others; being under a kind of necessity to ill-use all the persons of whom he stood in need, when he could not frighten them into compliance, and did not judge it his interest to be useful to them.<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, man now was, in consequence of a multiplicity of new desires, brought into "subjection to all nature".

...each became in some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other men: if rich, they stood in need of the services of others; if poor, of their assistance; and even a middle condition did not enable them to do without one another.<sup>33</sup>

In short, "there arose rivalry and competition on the one hand, and conflicting interests on the other, together with a secret desire of profiting at the expense of others."<sup>34</sup>

Fifth, the selfish drive of man for wealth "at the expense of others" divided the whole society into "rich" and "poor", making conflict inevitable between them. "Usurpation by the rich, robbery by the poor, and the unbridled passions of both, suppressed the cries of natural compassion and the still feeble voice of justice, and filled men with avarice, ambition and vice."<sup>35</sup> Peace was broken. "There arose perpetual conflicts, which never ended but in battles and bloodshed."<sup>36</sup> This "most horrible state of war" (le plus horrible



état de guerre) was that which closed the state of nature.

The crucial moment in the destruction of the peace of the previous stage was that which brought "iron" and "wheat" into the savage society. But it is notable that Rousseau does not blame this development for the Hobbsean state of "war of all against all". Rather, he attributes "all the evils" of this stage to the "effects of property."<sup>37</sup> Although the technical progress of the natural state, crowned by the division of labour, destroyed the individual self-sufficiency of the savage enclosed within his family, what was vicious was not this, but the new economic situation which formed man's fulfilment of his needs to be dependent upon inter-individual, or inter-familial exchange. Man now had to depend on others for what he needed but could not produce. If this new situation is perceived as unjust and unnatural one, what is to blame is not technical progress, but those developments in social institutions which necessitated the struggle of selfish interests, and compelled man to seek the satisfaction of his vanity by means of the labour of others. Property is singled out as the target of criticism because it was the indispensable institutional weapon to dominate, both in production and in exchange.

Rousseau's hostile attitude to property has been sometimes exaggerated, for example, by Roger D. Masters who claims: "Even before scarcity leads the poor to attack the rich...property corrupts men by creating differences in wealth that force every man to depend on others for his survival."<sup>38</sup> Such an explanation, viewing property





as originating from "natural inequality", ignores an important factor in the formation of property as a right, that is, the creation of a convention among men. For Rousseau, it is not physical "force" but civil "convention" that creates a "right."<sup>39</sup> If property did appear in the second stage of nature, there must have been established a convention among family groups. And this convention was possible because the material basis of that time meant that man needed little and natural resources were relatively abundant. Man began to defend what he occupied and possessed when he became neighbour to others and things were not sufficiently available to be used by all. But others did not object to his defending what he possessed because they could make things by themselves - "imitate" - and did not have to fight for the "things" of someone else. Therefore, "before scarcity" - though scarcity is always relative - property did not "force man to depend on others". The vicious "effects of property" in the last stage of the state of nature originated not from property itself or the convention, but from property in conjunction with the market which forced man to seek endlessly more goods - more property. Ironically, such a situation was fermented by the increased productivity of human work. Here we see the paradoxical logic of human work. Work, which was born as a purposeful activity of man to preserve himself, becomes now an activity by which he demeans himself.

THE CIVIL STATE. -- The "war" in the final stage of the state of nature was, according to Rousseau, not "an expression of human nature", but "the effect of a system of factual relationships



established between man and the world."<sup>40</sup> Property, once established as an institution, and as characteristic of the "system of factual relations", established its own laws of momentum, to which man was subjugated. Independent of the will of the individual man, this system of property changed incessantly the "relations and interests" of men, driving them to a state of "continual fluctuation."<sup>41</sup> Neither "rich" nor "poor" enjoyed stability in their social position. Everything was subject to change because it was operated not by the "free-will" of man, but by an external force which was determined by the "factual relations". Rousseau thinks such a state of "continual fluctuation" was perceived by both "rich" and "poor" as a "wretched situation."<sup>42</sup> As long as they were slaves of their vanity, as long as their existence was dependent on such fluctuating factual relations, neither rich nor poor could be content and comfortable.

The solution to this "wretched situation" could be achieved not by nature but by man, not by passion but by reason, not by chance but by calculated establishment of new social institutions. The initiative was taken by the rich man when he attempted "to employ in his favour the forces of those who attacked him", that is, "to make allies of his adversaries."<sup>43</sup>

...After having represented to his neighbours the horror of a situation which armed every man against the rest, and made their possessions as burdensome to them as their wants, and in which no safety could be expected either in riches or in poverty, he readily devised plausible arguments to make them close with his design. "Let us join", said he, "to guard the weak from oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and to secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him: let us institute rules of justice and peace, to which all without exception may be obliged to conform; rules that may in some measure make amends for the caprices of fortune, by subjecting equally the powerful and weak to the observance of reciprocal





obligations. Let us, in a word, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, collect them in a supreme power which may govern us by wise laws, protect and defend all the members of association, repulse their common enemies, and maintain eternal harmony among us."<sup>44</sup>

Thus were established "moral" institutions through a social convention. The proposal of the rich was, as C.W. Hendel indicates, to give "mutual guarantees to respect the existing property and claims of each other, the rich assured of their social superiority, the poor of only their foolish prospect."<sup>45</sup> Although the rich were astute enough to foresee that such a contract would secure their selfish interest, the poor - "so barbarous and easily seduced" - could not read the hidden trick. The poor thus thought it expedient "to sacrifice one part of their freedom to ensure the rest."<sup>46</sup> Despite its perpetuation of inequality, however, the new institution of morality, under the form of "civil laws", became the basis of common rule within a community, leaving the law of nature - the laws of necessity and force - only for relations with other communities. Even in the latter case, the law of nature became little by little replaced by certain kinds of "convention".

Rousseau perceives the development of the civil state in three stages, particularly in terms of "the progress of inequality". In the first stage the "law of man" replaced the "law of nature" and the right of property became established in the community. This meant that the existing advantages of the rich and disadvantages of the poor became authorised by a man-made "convention". The initial distribution of property that had originated in the later stages of the natural state became now in the first stage of the civil state



legitimised even before the appearance of the State.

The second stage was characterised by the "institution of magistracy". The merely economic inequality of the previous stage became in this new stage translated into a series of political relationships. During the interval between the establishment of property and that of political government, the only relationship between different social groups was that of rich and poor: "...in fact, before the institution of [political] laws, men had no other way of reducing their equals to submission, than by attacking their goods, or making some of their own over to them."<sup>47</sup> With the inauguration of political government, the economic relation of rich and poor was reorganised in accordance with the already emerging unbalance of power between the two social groups into a stabilised relation between powerful and weak. The rich became powerful and commanded; the poor became weak and obeyed. Rousseau regards the establishment of the political government as a "real contract between the people and the chiefs chosen by them."<sup>48</sup> By the contract both the powerful and the weak bound themselves to observe the laws which the contract contained and made possible, thus forming a political "State". By "alienating" their previous power to protect themselves to the powerful, the weak received new political rights under the authority of new political power. However, actual political States in history have been always "imperfect", because they have been made on the basis of particular interests, a set of particular relationships.

Society consisted at first merely of a few general conventions, which every member bound himself to observe; and for the performance of covenants the whole body guaranteed security to each individual. Experience only could show the





weakness of such a constitution, and how easily it might be infringed with impunity, from the difficulty of convicting men of faults, where the public alone was to be witness and judge: the laws could not but be eluded in many ways; disorders and inconveniences could not but multiply continually, till it became necessary to commit the dangerous trust of public authority to private persons, and the care of enforcing obedience to the deliberations of the people to the magistrate.<sup>49</sup>

The political State, based merely on "a few general conventions", was by nature a private, particular association representing conflicting interests rather than a universal entity. So it inevitably led to a state where "intrigues set in, factions formed, party feeling grew bitter, civil wars broke out", that is, a state of "disorders and inconveniences". This "primitive anarchy", coming from the superficiality and unthoroughness of the first political contract, exposed the nature of the contract, demonstrating that it was merely the subjection of the weak to the powerful. The public, theoretically the sole "witness and judge" of the State, eventually gave up its authority to the powerful, to "private persons". This resulted in the sacrifice of individual men to the "pretended happiness of the State", and ultimately reinforced those who were in power.

The last stage of the civil state saw the conversion of legitimate power to an arbitrary despotism, transforming social relations into that of master and slave. Rousseau views this stage as being the age of "the last degree of inequality". The slavery and tyranny of this state were "the fruit of an excess of corruption" in which "the law of the strongest" alone ruled.<sup>50</sup> As the result of the strengthening of their position, the magistrates became hereditary,

grew accustomed to consider their magistracy as a family possession, to regard themselves as proprietors of the State,



of which they were at first only officers, to call their fellow citizens their slaves, count them like cattle in the number of things that belonged to them, and call themselves equals of the gods and kings of kings.<sup>51</sup>

The citizens, feeling the growing inequality, accepted it as a reality and even positively let themselves "oppressed" because such a despotism created a certain ground on which man could feed his ambition for power.

The citizens...let themselves be oppressed only insofar as they are carried away by blind ambition; and looking more below than above them, domination becomes dearer to them than independence, and they consent to wear chains in order to give them to others in turn.<sup>52</sup>

In other words, the people imitated and even identified themselves with the tyrant and consequently the basic relation of master and slave became repeated throughout the society. Man became a brutal master to his inferiors and a debased slave to his superiors. Despite this, in a society under despotism, it was, actually, only a few who were "rich" and "powerful" that stayed "at the height of grandeur and fortune". The crowd had to "grovel in obscurity and misery", because, by principle, despots "prize the things they enjoy only insofar as the others are deprived of them", and because, "they would cease to be happy if the people ceased to be miserable."<sup>53</sup> It was oppression for its own sake that existed in civil society.

In such a situation government lost its character as a "political" organisation; it came to consist of a single personage who saw himself as the owner of his subjects. This meant that the first social contract that created a political State had totally failed, and the civil state had returned to the original chaos of the "war of all against all", where bare physical force was the dominant principle of







human behaviour. Man now had destroyed "what man had made". If there was any solution of the existing human misery, it must be that either all the existing social institutions be "entirely dissolved by new revolutions, or brought back again to legitimacy."<sup>54</sup>

Why did the attempt at a political solution fail to eradicate the egoistic psyche of the "state of war"? Was it impossible to solve the problem by a political approach? In Rousseau's view, it was not the political character of the solution but its unthoroughness. The principal motive in drawing up the first contract was "a selfish interest, a seeking to perpetuate the power that has been developed by accident and not by right."<sup>55</sup> Thus, as Rousseau himself says, "the flaws which make social institutions necessary are the same as make abuse of them unavoidable."<sup>56</sup> A truly "political" solution that might insure the rights of natural man in the civil situation was to come, as we will see in the next chapter, from a new general contract based upon common interests instead of partial and particular interests grounded upon egoistic motives.

This history of social relations, from the relation of rich and poor, to that of powerful and weak, and eventually to that of master and slave, shows how work, in becoming a social activity with the division of labour, came to demean man. In the relation of rich and poor, which was in the first place a social expression of innate endowments, men saw the increasing discrepancy between the "haves" and "have-nots", which advantages originating from the division of labour had given rise to. The "haves" could diminish their work so as to



enjoy their leisure, while the "have-nots" had to suffer "perpetual labour" for mere survival. In the next stage, an increasing discrepancy liberated one group in the society from all their bodily work and placed them in the position of officers of political government. The "haves" became "powerful" enough to support themselves by means of the labour of others, and the "have-nots" became subject to still heavier labour to feed not only themselves but those who did not work, believing that the new political association would protect what they were theoretically supposed to possess. Unfortunately, however, the original defect of the first political contract, that is, its partial and particular character, elevated those "officers" to "masters" and demeaned those who were poor and weak to an even more miserable condition of slave. Man now had to work not for himself but for others; in other words, he became estranged from his work. The perception of work in such an historical context provides a suggestive direction for considering political solutions to the existing social problems. A suitable measure had to be taken in the new political contract for eliminating the evil effects of the division of labour, that is, the discrepancy between "haves" and "have-nots". Work had to be restored as a natural activity of man for his preservation.

## 2. Work and the Socialisation of the Child

THE CHILD AND EDUCATION IN THE CIVIL STATE. -- The principal





enemy in Rousseau's educational doctrine is the prejudice of the existing society, which is contaminated by, and in service to, the selfish drive of those who want to perpetuate their privileges. Being slave to his egoistic amour-propre, every man in this society - whether or not he belongs to the privileged group - mobilises all the artful and sly measures to protect his advantages and to enlarge them at the expense of others. Such egoism is reflected in estranged human relations in which "to seem to be" is distinguished from, and even more highly assessed than, "to be". Man's original nature is discarded, and everyone wears his own "masks". The behaviour of man is governed by "a servile and deceptive conformity", and "sincere friendship, real esteem, and perfect confidence are banished from men."<sup>57</sup> "Jealousy, suspicion, fear, coldness, reserve, hate and fraud lie constantly concealed under that uniform and deceitful veil of politeness; that boasted candour and urbanity, for which we are indebted to the light of this age."<sup>58</sup>

Educationally such an estrangement in human relationships forms a setting in which the child will be brought up to be fitted to the existing value system, that is, to its prejudice.

The most strikingly conservative aspect of this prejudice is its concern to maintain the distinction of rank. As Rousseau notes: "In the social order where each has his own place a man must be educated for it."<sup>59</sup> A child from a higher rank must be formed to a man of higher rank, and a child from a lower rank to a man of lower rank. To his audience, which consisted largely of members of high



society, Rousseau says: "Madame...you want to make him [your son] fit for nothing but a lord, a marquis, or a prince: and some day he may be less than nothing."<sup>60</sup> In educating a child of higher rank, such a class-based prejudice focusses on how to rule and exploit the "fools" of lower ranks. The father who wishes to do the right things for his child will therefore seek to produce a "worldly" man rather than a rational child.

"My son will have to take the world as he finds it, he will not live among the wise but among fools; he must therefore be acquainted with their follies, since they must be led by this means. A real knowledge of things may be a good thing in itself, but the knowledge of men and their opinions is better, for in human society man is the chief tool of man, and the wisest man is he who best knows the use of this tool...First teach them [children] wisdom, then show them the follies of mankind."<sup>61</sup>

Men of lower ranks are regarded not merely as "fools" but also as "tools" to be utilised for the welfare of the higher ranks. Ironically, the artificial education of the rich is carried out by such human "tools".

At birth the baby is given to a nurse; when he grows he is taught by a tutor hired by his parents and served by various kinds of servants. The most unfortunate effect of such an upbringing is that the child is from the early days of his life deprived of true parental love. A mother who gives up her baby to a wet nurse and a father who does not educate his child himself are destroying in the child the natural passion of pity which develops from the natural and humane relations of caring and being cared for. The emotional deprivation of children nursed and educated by others has several serious consequences:





...If the mother is too delicate to nurse her child, the father will be too busy to teach him. Their children, scattered about in schools, convents, and colleges, will find the home of their affections elsewhere, or rather they will form the habit of caring for nothing. Brothers and sisters will scarcely know each other; when they are together in company they will behave as strangers. When there is no confidence between relations, when the family society ceases to give savour to life, its place is soon usurped by vice.<sup>62</sup>

A nurse of another's child cannot be but "a bad mother", and even if she is able to develop certain maternal affections between herself and the child, this is possible only after the child has perished "a hundred times" because of the unnatural relationship. And, by the time the nurse has developed such an affection, her task is already completed, and she is dismissed, never again to be encouraged to approach to the child. The same is true of the tutor. However good a tutor he may be, all that he does is to complete "the development of the germs of artificiality which he finds already well grown."<sup>63</sup> He is bought by money, so he teaches for the father who provides the reward, not for the child; he is nothing but "a flunkey, who will soon train such another as himself."<sup>64</sup> The replacement of real parents with nurses and tutors results in the child's developing a haughty attitude towards these "hired" people. Be it tutors or nurses, there is no difference in the child's eyes between them and other servants. The child is taught to look down at them and "to treat them as mere servants".

A second harmful aspect of the education of the higher ranks is the method of upbringing employed by both nurse and tutor who attempt to subjugate the child to their artificial control. From birth on a child experiences endless "control, constraint,



compulsion":

The child has hardly left the mother's womb, it has hardly begun to move and stretch its limbs, when it is deprived of its freedom. It is wrapped in swaddling bands, laid down with its head fixed, its legs stretched out, and its arms by its sides; it is wound round with linen and bandages of all sorts so that it cannot move. It is fortunate if it has room to breathe, and it is laid on its side so that water which should flow from its mouth can escape, for it is not free to turn its head on one side for this purpose.<sup>65</sup>

Rousseau indicates that such physical constraints become "an insurmountable obstacle" in the way of necessary movements and thus slow down proper growth in physical strength. Such physical constraint, largely originating from the custom of using strangers to educate the child,<sup>66</sup> becomes a psychological control when the child, thanks to the help of others, begins to develop amour-propre. Both over-indulgence and over-severity are used to calm the child and to keep things in order. The new-born child "is alternately petted and shaken by way of soothing him; sometimes he is threatened, sometimes beaten, to keep him quiet."<sup>67</sup> This two-sided policy of the nurse transforms the child either to a "master of the universe", or to an extremely miserable creature. In either case, the child is obliged to invent artificial measures either to arouse compassion in others, or to harass them with stubbornness and willfulness. The conflict between child and the nurse becomes more severe when the child comes to a tutor who "issues his orders and thinks himself master."<sup>68</sup> Basically, the tutor's control of the child is in the same line as that of the nurse. He controls not because it is necessary for education, but because it is convenient to manage. But his control is more sophisticated and artificial than hers in the sense that he uses his authority instead of mere physical force and that he employs





rewards and punishments. Consequently, the tutor is elevated to a tyrant who commands, while the child is degraded to a slave who obeys. This compulsory obedience, nevertheless, instigates an invincible resistance in the mind of the child who has been from the early years accustomed to various modes of sophisticated control.

He [the child] uses the task you [the tutor] set him to obtain what he wants from you, and he can always make you pay for an hour's industry by a week's complaisance. You must be always making bargains with him. These bargains, suggested in your fashion, but carried out in his, always follow the direction of his own fancies, especially when you are foolish enough to make the condition some advantage he is almost sure to obtain, whether he fulfills his part of the bargain or not. The child is usually quicker to read the master's thoughts than the master to read the child's feelings.<sup>69</sup>

Thus by being controlled by the tutor the child goes through the conflict of generations and obtains a worldly "wisdom" for controlling both his inferiors and superiors.

A third failing of the existing education of children is its curriculum which is aimed at the formation of the man of the upper ranks. The child is thus excluded from all sorts of practical, productive activities. He must be brought up to be a "wise man" to rule the "fools" of the lower ranks whose duty is to labour in order to feed their masters. One of the most characteristic features of the existing education, therefore, is the separation of mental from physical activities. The child of the higher ranks is trained mentally and taught to despise physical labour because it is suitable only to the mean ranks. "From the very first" the child hears "spoken languages" which he never understands, and is forced to speak what he cannot pronounce. This verbal instruction is succeeded in childhood by verbal precepts the meaning of which is again never understandable



to the child, and by the inculcation of fragments of knowledges which are completely meaningless.

A fourth weakness of existing education is its inappropriate use of "reason" into children who are yet not "rational".

"Reason with children" was Locke's chief maxim; it is in the height of fashion at present, and I hardly think it is justified by its results; those children who have been constantly reasoned with strike me as exceedingly silly.<sup>70</sup>

Such an irrational application of "reason" to the child calls forth certain side-effects which actually encourage in him social evils. Besides the pedantry of fragmented knowledge, the "empty phrases of politeness", which "rational" moral reasoning habituates the child to, it equips him with an ability "to subdue those around him to his will."<sup>71</sup> The child who is accustomed to such phrases knows how to say "il me plait" by saying "s'il vous plait" and to say "je vous ordonne" by saying "je vous prie" in an irresistible way. On the other hand, reasoning with the child to persuade him of the "duty of obedience" deteriorates into a conflict of wills between tutor and child, and causes the child to cheat others with "empty words" whenever it is possible.<sup>72</sup> The child who is forced to act in accord with moral precepts because of the threat of punishment does so in order to escape the punishment and thus develops worldly wisdoms of "deceit, falsehood, and lying". Finally, the application of reason to the child who is not yet developmentally prepared for it enfeebles the child's ability to satisfy his needs by his own initiative. The child who is crammed with useless verbal precepts and is taught to despise physical activities is robbed of the "right to his own strength"<sup>73</sup> and therefore is always impotent in actual life situations. Thus the







"rational" education of the non-rational child only instigates his amour-propre because amour-propre increases "in proportion to his weakness".

The end-result of an education based on the prejudice of the existing society is a man totally ignorant of the "arts of living", but haughty, desirous of power and wealth, and capable only of manipulating men by malicious means for his own benefit. This man is fitted only for the higher ranks of the existing society, and, once the revolution comes to destroy every man-made institution, he will lose all means of his survival.

WORK DEVELOPED: PREADOLESCENCE(2). -- In the existing education work is completely excluded and even despised. An artificial education is designed essentially for those of the higher ranks who are not intended to work, but to rule those who work. But in a new educational scheme which aims at forming an "independent and free" man capable of supporting himself by means of his labour and of constituting with other men a new society on equal terms, work becomes a necessary activity. Instead of fitting the child to the existing social order, the education of a natural man has to implant in him an ability to survive external changes. Only this will secure an independence in his future life because, being able to support himself by himself, he will not need any help from others or any trick or "servility" to exploit others. Freedom, which consists in a balance between a child's desires and "what he is able to perform" or his



ability to do "what he desires,"<sup>74</sup> can be insured only by the child's engagement in the useful activity of physical work which the existing education despises. Thus by adopting work as the central element in his educational scheme Rousseau takes an "opposite course" to the existing, traditional education. In an isolated situation Emile developed his potential faculties through his interaction with the environment along the necessity of nature and then along the criterion of utility. Eventually, he begins to learn productive work skills so as to complete his ability to support himself.

The learning of productive work implies that the educator introduce the child to the division of labour which is the dominant mode of production in the civil state. Such a socialised and specialised work appears to Emile as a necessary "art" for the preservation of himself in a civil situation. Thus the independent natural man as the goal of education comes into conflict with the goal of producing a social man dependent on others. In order to complete himself as a natural man Emile must develop within himself certain social skills because without these he will not be able to maintain himself as an independent individual. Independence must be sought in dependence. Rousseau approaches to this dilemma very carefully. If the learning of skills for maintaining oneself as an independent individual demands that the child learn an art developed under the division of labour, Emile must learn it. But the historical role of the division of labour in producing inequality among men must not be forgotten because the purpose of learning work skills is not to repeat the process of human degradation, but to preserve what is natural and





truly humane in the civil state by restoring in the individual the natural ability of self-preservation. So, when Emile begins to socialise himself through learning a work skill under the division of labour, all the factors that contribute to demean men are deliberately eliminated. Emile thus experiences a totally different kind of socialisation from that which men have undergone phylogenically.

First of all, what is technical has to be distinguished from what is "moral". Emile may be introduced to the "industrial arts" in the second stage of preadolescence; but his education must be confined to the purely "technical" areas: "When the development of knowledge compels you to show him the mutual dependence of mankind, instead of showing him its moral side, turn all his attention at first towards industry and the mechanical arts which make men useful to one another."<sup>75</sup> There are a number of reasons given in the Emile for this discrimination of the technical from the moral side of the division of labour. First, the preadolescent is still mentally too immature to understand the actual social relations in society. Though he is physically strong enough to learn productive works, his reason has just begun to develop through most useful activities. Secondly, it is dangerous to expose the preadolescent, even before he understands the technique itself, to the evils which the division of labour has brought about.<sup>76</sup> Finally, the division of labour is not in itself, in Rousseau's view, the cause of human dependence although its appearance may signal it. As Rousseau points out, in Inégalité, if the use of "iron" and the consumption of "wheat" were always exactly balanced, equality might have been sustained between men.<sup>77</sup> Emile will thus



learn, at least in educational setting, the "industrial arts" without being exposed to their evil effects.

Beginning with the study of simple work, Emile moves to more complicated forms of work activity. Agriculture is first learnt because it is "the earliest and most honourable of arts;"<sup>78</sup> then metal work, then carpentry are introduced. Rousseau thinks that this is the proper order of studying work activities for a child who is not yet spoilt by vulgar opinions. This is the original order in which man developed his trades, and Emile, following this sequence will "go back to the first beginning" whenever he faces a new tool and begins to acquire a useful skill on the basis of what he has previously learnt. While engaged in agriculture, Emile derives "valuable considerations" from his Robinson Crusoe and acquires a comprehensive set of skills required for this "natural art". But working on a steel spring, he follows the processes by which steel is produced from iron and the spring out of the steel; seeing the pieces of a chest being put together, he traces its manufacture from the time the tree was cut down. In addition, he investigates the making of tools whenever he faces new ones. Thus by learning the "industrial arts" that are closely connected to each other, Emile eventually arrives at a notion of the "unity of the arts" which, on the basis of exchange, puts all the industries into a social network.

The notion of the unity of different trades, which characterises the third stage of the learning of work in preadolescence, is significant in the sense that it introduces the





child for the first time to the civil society. Emile who was already in childhood exposed to certain primitive moral conceptions concerning work and property comes to know that "to get tools for his own use, other people must have theirs, and that he can get in exchange what he needs and they possess."<sup>79</sup> Rousseau develops this emerging notion of exchange into an egalitarian picture of society where each man, producing useful goods according to his specialised trade, links up with others by exchange and thus enjoys mutual benefits.

Let us form these ten men into a society, and let each devote himself to the trade for which he is best adapted, and let him work at it for himself and for the rest. Each will reap the advantage of the others' talents, just as if they were his own; by practice each will perfect his own talent, and thus all the ten, well provided for, will still have something to spare for others. This is the plain foundation of all our institutions.<sup>80</sup>

The underlying assumption of this picture of society is that the exchange must be conducted in equal terms: "There can be no society without exchange, no exchange without a common standard of measurement, no common standard of measurement without equality."<sup>81</sup> This equality, characterised as "conventional equality", forms a morality "either in men or things"<sup>82</sup> for the foundation of the society. In "men" this conventional equality may develop into "positive" laws such as "government" and "kings", that is, political associations; in "things" it may imply an established convention regarding the "rights of property". This society, as an association of producers, lacks all the social inequalities that man experienced throughout the history of the civil state and therefore provides a vision of a new society which may ultimately replace the existing one.



WORK AND SOCIALISATION: ADOLESCENCE. — By the time Emile enters adolescence, he has already acquired an ability in work activities and formed a conception of society in its economic relations. In gaining a vocational skill, carpentry, Emile has equipped himself with an essential means of maintaining an independent, free life; he has, so to speak, obtained a material ground for being a natural, individual man. At the same time, the learning of vocational skills ("trade") has led him to an understanding of the technical side of the division of labour and to a knowledge of the economic benefits it brings through exchange. A primitive conception of an egalitarian society has thus been formed in Emile, at least in a purely technical and mechanical connection. Finally, the vocational training provided in preadolescence has developed the primitive notion of property formed in childhood to a practical notion which operates in actual, working situations. Thus in acquiring work skills Emile comes to apprehend that "to get tools for his own use, other people must have theirs", and that property as a right is the convention contained in the phrase, "le Mien, le Tien".

The vision of society thus formed contains some characteristics similar to the "natural society" where the savage worked for his independent and free life and enjoyed mutual intercourse based on equality. The only difference is that this new society consists not of self-sufficient individuals, but of individuals who sustain their life by means of an exchange on equal terms. Basically, the two societies are consistent in that both are maintained only insofar as each individual of society does not seek to





feed his selfish interests by sacrificing others. In the new egalitarian society under the division of labour one's production must be balanced, in its exchange value, with the goods he needs to support his "independent and free" life, and his desire must be kept within his ability to produce. In other words, what is needed for maintaining this new society is, besides the ability to work, the control of one's desires. So in adolescence, which follows preadolescence, a psychological measure is taken to tame the passions of the developing child.

The child's abilities having almost reached those of an adult, not only in work skills but in physical strength, adolescence begins with an explosion of vitality which inflates the child's imagination, driving it to an emotional crisis: "As the roaring of the waves precedes the tempest, so the murmur of rising passions announces this tumultuous change...A change of temper, frequent outbreaks of anger, a perpetual stirring of the mind, make the child almost ungovernable."<sup>83</sup> If the exploding passions are not properly tamed, the child is apt to stray into amour-propre, into an irreversible egoism. The child must repress his growing amour-propre, keep his needs simple, and thus preserve his self-sufficiency. This need to control certain of his needs, coupled with the psychological effects of the mature rational aspects of adolescence, demands a totally new educational measure. Instead of the "negative" measure, which aimed at permitting physical growth and increasing a practical ability to meet one's needs in terms of necessity and utility, a "positive" approach is required, "to establish law and order among the rising passions, prolong the period



of their development, so that they may have time to find their proper place as they arise."<sup>84</sup> Contrary to the negative method, the positive method will not encourage natural progress, but delay it and make sure the pupil is able to use his passions rightly. Two criteria are suggested for this new educational approach: "First, to be conscious of the true relations of man both in the species and the individual; second, to control all the affections in accordance with these relations."<sup>85</sup> In short, the right use of one's passions lies in controlling them according to the lessons to be learned both from man's ontogenic and phylogenic development.

According to Rousseau, the course of the passions is determined by the faculty of imagination, which is very easily inspired by one's surroundings. Once the prey of his imagination, the pupil will be swept along with conventional vulgar opinions, and his amour-propre will flourish. Imagination has therefore to be checked, and the pupil urged "in the opposite direction",<sup>86</sup> in the direction of "feeling and reason", and of "morality":

So long as his consciousness is confined to himself there is no morality in his actions; it is only when it begins to extend beyond himself that forms first the sentiments and then the ideas of good and ill, which make him indeed a man, and an integral part of his species.<sup>87</sup>

In other words, the pupil, his imagination being checked, has to be guided to adapt his passions to a proper social relationship. So the "positive" education in adolescence bears two distinctive objectives. First, amour de soi, which the functional skills of productive work now serve, has to extend itself to include "pity" and, ultimately, "love". Second, this emotional development must be accompanied by





moral self-regulation and the finding of an appropriate place in society. The former leads to fraternity with fellow men and love of a member of the opposite sex, while the latter guides Emile to morality and membership in a society.

Adolescence is a "long period of unrest" which directs the young adult to "survey others" and to be interested in those who are about him. "We are not meant to live along; [thinks Rousseau] thus the heart is thrown open to human affection, and becomes capable of attachment."<sup>88</sup> This expanding vitality is an expression of amour de soi, which, as was the case with the savage, is the source of pity, or compassion. Rousseau recommends that this "pity" be developed into a sense of humanity by directing the rising imagination of the youth to his fellow men. Beginning around the age of sixteen, the young man's imagination is "kindled by the first beginnings of growing sensibility and, thanks to this imagination, the youth comes "to perceive himself in his fellow-creatures, to be touched by their cries, to suffer in their sufferings."<sup>89</sup> Such compassion for suffering is the origin of all human associations because, being the recognition of insufficiency<sup>90</sup> not only of the one who is pitied but also the one who pities, it absorbs all distinctions of rank into the idea of men in general.<sup>91</sup> It thus unites them in their common weakness, insufficiency and suffering. Of course, the simple emotion of pity does not in itself lead to an "abstract" idea of humanity; Emile must be encouraged to consider his own feelings and the feelings he observes in others. Only after a long training is the youth capable of pity, of affection, and aware of the affection of others. These



emotional developments give rise to the first stirrings of conscience and to the responses of love and hatred, which consequently will provide the initial notions of good and evil.

This educational work on the developing pity of the youth culminates in the formation of a rational ability to form judgments on his fellow men and to select suitable companions. According to Rousseau, the concept of justice is concerted with that of "kindness". For, only when true affections are enlightened by reason, can justice and kindness emerge. Meanwhile, social justice cannot properly be established by reason alone, without any "instinctive need of the human heart."<sup>92</sup> Thus, it is through his natural passion of pity, which is an extension of his amour de soi, that Emile is taught to distinguish what is good from what is ill in his contemporary society.

...Let him know that man is by nature good, let him feel it, let him judge his neighbour by himself; but let him see how men find the source of all their vices in their preconceived opinions; let him be disposed to respect the individual, but to despise the multitude; let him see that all men wear almost the same mask, but let him also know that some faces are fairer than the mask that conceals them.<sup>93</sup>

It is this final touch of combining passion with reason that develops the youth with work skills into a "natural" man able to enjoy "social" relations, a man who is "free and independent" and quite different from the slaves in the existing society. The ontogenic repetition of the phylogenic process of socialisation is thus completed in adolescence by adding a psychological apparatus for social life to the productive skills obtained in preadolescence, through the "opposite course".





## NOTES

1 "Le sauvage", or its plural form "les sauvages", designates the man of enlightenment in the second stage of the state of nature, while "l'homme sauvage" points to the man of animality in the purely natural state. See Duchet, M., Anthropologie et Histoire au Siècle des Lumières, François Maspéro, Paris, 1971, p. 335.

2 Essai sur l'Origine des Langues, Aubier, Paris, 1974, p. 137. My translation.

3 Ibid., p. 138.

4 Ibid., p. 137. My translation.

5 Ibid., p. 136. My translation.

6 Ibid., p. 120. My translation.

7 Ibid., p. 137.

8 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 169; SC/E, p. 212.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 170.

11 Emile, OC, IV, p. 493; EM/E, p. 174.

12 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 170; SC/E, p. 213.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 164; Masters, J.R. (tr.), The First and Second Discourses, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1964, p. 141.

15 Contrat Social, OC, III, pp. 365-7.

16 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 173; SC/E, p. 216-7.

17 See Locke, J., Two Treatises on Government, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960, pp. 303-20, passim.

18 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 167; SC/E, p. 210.

19 Ibid., p. 171; SC/E, p. 214.

20 Ibid., p. 175.



- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., p. 168.
- 23 Ibid., p. 169.
- 24 Ibid., p. 166; SC/E, p. 209.
- 25 Ibid., p. 173; SC/E, p. 216.
- 26 Ibid., p. 172; SC/E, p. 215.
- 27 Ibid., p. 173; SC/E, p. 216.
- 28 Ibid., p. 171; SC/E, p. 214.
- 29 Ibid., p. 174; SC/E, p. 217. Translation partially revised.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Lettre à Christophe de Beaumont, OC, IV, p. 937.
- 32 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 175; SC/E, p. 218.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Ibid., p. 176; SC/E, p. 219.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ibid., p. 175.
- 38 Masters, R.D., The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1968, p. 179.
- 39 Contrat Social, OC, III, pp. 354-5.
- 40 "Notes et Variantes", OC, III, pp. 1349-50. My translation.
- 41 Ecrits sur l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre, OC, III, p. 602. My translation.
- 42 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 176.
- 43 Ibid., p. 177; SC/E, p. 220.
- 44 Ibid., SC/E, pp. 220-1.
- 45 Hendel, C.W., Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralism, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1934, p. 57.





- 46 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 178; SC/E, p. 221.
- 47 Ibid., p. 179; SC/E, pp. 22-3.
- 48 Ibid., p. 184; SC/E, p. 228.
- 49 Ibid., p. 180; SC/E, p. 223.
- 50 Masters, R.D., op. cit., p. 196.
- 51 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 187; Masters' translation, p. 172.
- 52 Ibid., p. 188; Masters' translation, p. 173.
- 53 Ibid., p. 189; Masters' translation, p. 175.
- 54 Ibid., p. 187; SC/E, p. 231.
- 55 Hendel, C.W., op. cit., p. 54.
- 56 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 187; SC/E, p. 231.
- 57 Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, OC, III, p. 8; SC/E, p. 132.
- 58 Ibid., pp. 8-9; SC/E, pp. 132-3. Translation partially revised.
- 59 Emile, OC, IV, p. 251; EM/E, p. 9.
- 60 Ibid., p. 470; EM/E, p. 158.
- 61 Ibid., p. 457-8; EM/E, p. 149.
- 62 Ibid., p. 262; EM/E, pp. 16-7.
- 63 Ibid., p. 261; EM/E, p. 16.
- 64 Ibid., p. 263; EM/E, p. 17.
- 65 Ibid., pp. 253-4; EM/E, p. 10.
- 66 "D'où vient cet usage déraisonnable? D'un usage dénaturé. Depuis que les mères méprisant leur premier devoir n'ont plus voulu nourrir leurs enfans, il a falu les confier à des femmes mercenaires, qui se trouvant ainsi mères d'enfans étrangers pour qui la nature ne leur disoit rien, n'ont cherché qu'a s'épargner de la peine." (Ibid., p. 255)
- 67 Ibid., p. 261; EM/E, p. 15.
- 68 Ibid., p. 362; EM/E, p. 84.
- 69 Ibid.



- 70 Ibid., p. 317; EM/E, p. 53.
- 71 Ibid., p. 312; EM/E, p. 50.
- 72 Ibid., pp. 319-20.
- 73 Ibid., p. 309.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 Ibid., p. 455; EM/E, p. 148.
- 76 Ibid.
- 77 Inégalité, OC, III, p. 174.
- 78 Emile, OC, IV, p. 460; EM/E, p. 151.
- 79 Ibid., p. 1467; EM/E, p. 156.
- 80 Ibid., pp. 466-7; EM/E, p. 156.
- 81 Ibid., p. 461; EM/E, p. 152.
- 82 Ibid.
- 83 Ibid., pp. 489-90; EM/E, p. 172.
- 84 Ibid., p. 500; EM/E, p. 180.
- 85 Ibid., p. 501; EM/E, p. 180.
- 86 Ibid., p. 500; EM/E, p. 180.
- 87 Ibid., p. 501; EM/E, p. 181.
- 88 Ibid., p. 502; EM/E, p. 181.
- 89 Ibid., p. 504; EM/E, p. 183.
- 90 Ibid., p. 503; EM/E, p. 182.
- 91 Ibid., p. 509.
- 92 Ibid., p. 523; EM/E, p. 196.
- 93 Ibid., p. 525; EM/E, p. 198.





## CHAPTER FOUR:

### Work, Education and Politicisation

#### 1. Work in the New Society

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. -- The failure of the political government launched in the second stage of the civil state was due to the "unthoroughness" of its political character. A way out of the slavery of the third stage has therefore to be "thoroughly" political. In the Contrat Social Rousseau proposes the establishment of a government along thoroughly political lines. This government, which must be a "sure and legitimate rule of administration", will be in accordance with "what [natural] right sanctions" and "what [individual] interest prescribed", in other words, guaranteeing "justice" and the "well-being" of the people.<sup>1</sup> In the original, natural state men did not have any notion of justice; only after they came to have something to defend from others did they begin to develop an idea of it. So justice is essentially social. On the other hand, the notion of well-being is an extension of the notion of "necessity" and is as natural as the instincts for self-preservation and freedom. Therefore a truly political government guaranteeing justice and well-being is by its nature a social means to preserve what is natural



in man. Only by this artificial measure can man-made evils be eradicated.

Thus the new political contract which aims at a perfect solution to the problems of the slavery of the third civil stage implies a replacement of the first historical political contract with a new and perfect one. The weakness of the first contract was that it consisted of "a few general conventions" and degraded the association of men to a mere "aggregation"<sup>2</sup> of particular and partial relations. This weakness must be eradicated by expanding the contract to a general agreement among all individuals in a society. To prevent such weakness means to eliminate all the factors that are involved in the failure of the first contract and to complete the shift from the state of nature to the civil state. The existing political relations are "null and void"<sup>3</sup> because, by betraying and infringing the "rights" of men that a society exists to secure, they have debased the government to an instrument of fulfilling the selfish desire of the person who rules. The existing society is in this sense merely an extension of the state of nature, a state where no social, or artificial, measure is established to secure man's proper and natural rights, his "justice" and "well-being". Rousseau's point de départ in elaborating a new political solution is therefore the final stage of the state of nature, and his social contract theory is suggested as an alternate choice to the existing order. It is in this connection that Rousseau can be termed a revolutionary and responsible for the revolutions which followed him.





Rousseau's basic problem-consciousness of securing man's natural rights by social means is reflected in the determination of the conditions of the new government. For him, somewhat ironically, the power and authority of the political government are legitimate because they originate from a contract established by men; they cannot claim legitimacy by claiming to be based on nature. It is only a convention among men that gives legitimacy to a government; no amount of physical force can do so. Thus all forms of slavery - whether it is claimed they are based on conquest or contract - are "illegitimate", "absurd" and "meaningless" since they cannot be grounded on "natural" rights which are by definition "conventions": "It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to a man or to a people: 'I make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to my advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will keep it as long as I like'"<sup>4</sup>

Conventions established among people can be formalised into a "contract". The logical ground of this social contract is to be found in the anthropological development of man in the state of nature.

I suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state...

...as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.<sup>5</sup>

This "single motive power" is enough to bring about the "sum of existing forces" and to overcome the obstacles which stand in the way



of the establishment of the contract. Such a sum of forces, which enabled men to survive natural disasters in the past, now unites them against despotism in such a way that in association man obeys himself alone while at the same time obeying all; in other words, man can remain free while constituting a political State by renouncing his freedom.

There is, then, a paradoxical logic to the social contract.<sup>6</sup> First, man alienates - gives up - totally himself, together with all his rights, to the whole community. This alienation, being "total" and "absolute", implies that "the conditions are the same for all", that is, everyone gives all that he has, including his right to life. Second, the alienation, being without reserve, means that the union that the contract attains is as perfect as possible. No individual associate is given any right to demand more than others do. All the associates are equal. Third, each individual associate, in giving himself to all, actually gives himself to nobody, and "as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has."<sup>7</sup> The most striking benefit of the total contract through a "total alienation" is therefore that man can increase the force for his preservation, and his freedom, without losing anything. Such a benefit was impossible in the partial contracts in the past, in which the weak, by giving themselves to the strong, wanted only to be protected by the latter.





By the contract man creates a whole community and becomes one of its inseparable parts. The community that the contract produces is a "moral and collective" body, composed of its members. This body is in reality a "public person" (personne publique) in contrast to the private individual. As a "body" and as a "person" this new moral association is given birth, lives, has its will, acts, and dies just as any individual man does. Rousseau refers to this new body sometimes as a "State", sometimes as a "republic", sometimes as a "body politic" (corps politique). The body politic as a public person acts according to its "general" will, which is not identical to, or even the sum of, the particular wills of all individual members. Rousseau thus distinguishes the general will from the mere sum of all particular private wills.<sup>8</sup> Rather, the general will considers only the "common interest" and must ignore individual, particular, private interests.

The general will of the body politic is represented by law: "By the social compact we have given the body politic existence and life; we have now by legislation to give it movement and will."<sup>9</sup> As a general will, the law is created by a convention among the people, who by the contract transformed themselves from individual natural men, and is observed by the people themselves. No differences are admitted between those who legislate and those for whom the law is decreed; they are "two aspects of the entire object, without there being any division of the whole."<sup>10</sup> It is this equality of the two aspects of the whole, which makes the body politic a "republic" - every State that is governed by such laws may be considered a "republic" - and



which differentiates it from the old magistracy. For, in fact, the "law" of the magistrate was actually not a law, but a "decree" or an "act" of the magistrate as an individual, private person. What then is the form and content of the law? Law is a determination of what the political State must do for the preservation of the contract, and therefore the people. Fundamental to legislation and the exercise of the law is "justice", which is by definition a social expression of natural rights for the preservation and freedom of men. "Doubtless, there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual."<sup>11</sup> Through laws, accordingly, all the natural demands which brought men to a social contract are translated into public regulations which consider the people en masse and act "in the abstract". The effect of legislation on the individual is as follows:

Let us draw up the whole account in terms easily commensurable. What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses...We might, over and above all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribed to ourselves is liberty.<sup>12</sup>

All the enlightening of the natural inclinations in an individual man, including his desire for freedom, is now replaced by the primacy of social justice, which is a balance between different interests. Man then regulates himself by a moral value-system. The domination of law is, to sum up, a rule of the general will over the particular wills, the subjugation of "natural liberty", which is "bounded only by the strength of the individual", to "civil liberty", which is "limited by the general will."<sup>13</sup>







"HOMME" AND "CITOYEN". -- The subjugation of the individual, particular wills to the general will does not imply the obliteration of the former. For if the individual demands are sacrificed on behalf of the "common" and public cause, which is by nature an "abstraction", the resultant totalitarian government would be in contradiction to the initial motive for the establishment of the contract, the preservation of men in "independence and freedom". What the political State is to eliminate is not the individuality of man but the dependency created by the conflicting individual interests which historically resulted in the creation of the civil state. By giving himself to the State man allows himself to be "forced to be free", rather than to be exterminated. So the formation of the political State, and that of the general will, presupposes the existence and maintenance, rather than the obliteration, of the individual wills. It is only in its relation with the individual that the State - the "Sovereignty" - can function properly.

The relationship of the political State with its subjects is not that "between a superior and an inferior"; it is rather a relationship "between the body and each of its members."<sup>14</sup> With the establishment of political government, accordingly, the convention among individuals that gave birth to the contract transforms itself into a convention between the State and its citizens, between the whole and its parts. Rousseau elaborates this relationship in the well known sentence:

It [the convention between the body and each of its members] is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and equitable, because common to all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable, because



guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power.<sup>15</sup>

As a member of the political State an individual becomes a "citoyen". Insofar as the political State is a moral body, a conceptual being, purposefully inaugurated by the participants to the contract, membership in it implies a set of moral relationships. In Rousseau's terminology it is a persona ficta. On the other hand, the fundamental purpose of the contract to preserve the natural right to exist and enjoy freedom enables man even under the rule of the political State to sustain his inviolable rights, while at the same time being obliged by the contract to fulfill the duty imposed upon him as a "citoyen". An individual becomes Janus-faced. On the one side, as a "citoyen" he is a positive participant to the "Sovereignty" of the State; on the other side he remains still a natural man, an "homme". Such a split within an individual man is secured by the actual conditions of the contract which, despite the theoretical imperative of requiring the individual to alienate "totally", without any reserve, his entire individuality, exacts from him "only such part of...powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control."<sup>16</sup>

Every service a citoyen can render the State he ought to render as soon as the Sovereign demands it; but the Sovereign, for its part, cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause.<sup>17</sup>

The split of homme from citoyen does not remain merely as a theoretical opposition. On its practical side oftentimes it produces clashes over conflicting interests.

In fact, each individual, as an homme, may have a particular





will contrary or dissimilar to the general will which he has as a citoyen. His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest: his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him look upon what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will do less harm to others than the payment of it is burdensome to himself; and, regarding the moral person which contributes the State as a person ficta, because not an homme, he may wish to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfill the duties of a subject.<sup>18</sup>

Such egoistic inclinations are incompatible with the basic needs of the political State. As an "antithesis of natural man" the State requires him to abandon "his moi which is replaced by a share in the larger unit of society."<sup>19</sup> Ego-centrism must be suppressed in order to preserve the advantages which the social contract has brought about.

In order then that the social compact may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertakings, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body...In this lies the key to the working of the political machine; this alone legitimises civil undertakings, which, without it, would be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most frightful abuses.<sup>20</sup>

An attempt has been made by P.D. Jimack to explain the homme in this connection by referring to the notion of amour-propre: "In fact", he writes, "self-love will only conflict necessarily with the requirements of society when it becomes self-preference". Therefore, Jimack continues, "The self-love he [Rousseau] describes as being incompatible with the necessary qualities of the true citizen does seem in fact to be self-preference, amour-propre rather than amour de soi."<sup>21</sup> But when we consider carefully the opposition between homme and citoyen in the Emile, which Jimack refers to, his argument can be challenged. "Forced to struggle with nature or social institutions, [writes Rousseau] one has to choose either to be an homme or a



citoyen: because he cannot be both at the same time."<sup>22</sup> The fundamental question posed by Rousseau, then, is not whether man must choose either to be homme or to be citoyen. Rather, it is whether he should cling to an existence lived in natural conditions and reject social and political life, or seek society in order to cope with the evils which the development of human perfectibility will inevitably bring about. If a life in society is chosen, one must become a citoyen because being citoyen is the only possible way to solve the existing problems of natural individual men (hommes). So in Rousseau's theory of the social contract, it is the natural, individual man (homme) himself that is opposed to the political, conceptual man (citoyen). The "either-or" demonstration of the two men shows merely the fact that one can become a citoyen only by ceasing to be an homme. In this sense, Jimack's attempt to find the passion of amour-propre, which is developed only in social relations, in the theoretically natural man (homme) is not successful.

Rousseau is in no doubt that man cannot remain in the state of nature. Finding the solution to the problems of the existing society in the concept of citoyen, Rousseau lays all his priorities on its realisation. The goal of the political government is "the preservation and prosperity"<sup>23</sup> of its citoyens; the citoyen, on the other hand, has to give even his life whenever the government wants. Moreover, the government is empowered to eliminate the person who, by violating the law, attempts to return to "merely an homme."<sup>24</sup> Theoretically, in the political State homme is not allowed to exist. Nevertheless, the citoyen as the object of the government's protection







remains in himself still an homme. The man whom the government is to protect is not other than the man who lives, loves, and works in order to support himself, in everyday life situations, in private, individual relations with others. Homme is still there. It is this relatively small and therefore somewhat ignored domain of the private man which can, eventually, ferment egoism and cause the degeneration of the political State to a mere formula, though Rousseau was not yet aware of it. This danger is particularly evident in the problems associated with work and property in the new society.

WORK AND PROPERTY IN THE NEW SOCIETY. -- Theoretically, the social contract makes everything a man has, including the man himself, a possession of the State. All the resources at one's command, all the goods one possesses, come under the proprietorship of the political government. Without this "nationalisation" the social contract is meaningless because the basis of the contract is a "total alienation". But, as the logic of the "total alienation" is "to give to nobody by giving to all", the proprietorship of the State implies that no change is to occur in actual proprietorship. Indeed, the fact that the forces of the State are "incomparably greater" than those of any individual ensures that the property of the individual man has now a "stronger and irrevocable" legitimacy:

The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as depositories of the public good, and having their rights respected by all the members of the State and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a



cession which benefits both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak, all that they gave up.<sup>25</sup>

By putting their property under the legal or nominal possession of the State the people make their right to their property inviolable and sacred. Such a paradoxical theory of the ownership in the political State bears two significant implications for individual economic life.

First, the right to property is perceived as a natural right, and, therefore, not to be infringed by anything, and protected positively by the State: "Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs."<sup>26</sup> The right of the "first occupier", which was "so weak" in the natural state of things, now becomes a claim, through the social contract, available to every man in society. The underlying assumption of such a legitimisation of property is that the property of an individual is his "share" in the society he lives in.

Secondly and conversely, private property, the right which each individual has to his land and goods, is always to be subordinate to the right which the State has over all.<sup>27</sup> The State, being the ruler of its subjects, claims a right to all the goods they have, thus establishing legal grounds to intervene in the private sector in order to prevent disparities in wealth. For the political government, "it is not enough to have citizens and to protect them, it is also necessary to consider their subsistence."<sup>28</sup> It is in this sense that the State reserves a right to the property of the individuals.

In the Discours sur l'Economie Politique Rousseau stresses the right of property as being "the most sacred of all the rights of





citizenship, and even more important in some respects than liberty itself."<sup>29</sup> The ground for this contention is: 1) property affects the preservation of life; 2) property deserves a greater legal attention because it is more difficult to defend than life; and 3) property is the true foundation of civil society, and the real guarantee that individuals will reap the reward of their labour.<sup>30</sup> Such a positive perception of property, evidently in contrast to the negative view of it as the source of all the evils of the civil state, is derived from the model of the "natural society" of the second stage of the state of nature. Without depending on others, the savage worked on the land he occupied, managed an autarkical domestic economy, and enjoyed independent, mutual intercourse with his neighbours. Just as such a "self-sufficient" economy was the basis of a natural equality, the egalitarian policy of the political State can be sustained only by the enjoyment of self-sufficiency by individuals. In order to be "free and independent", man must not depend on others; he must be economically independent and meet his needs by means of his work on his land.<sup>31</sup> That property is considered in the political State as a means to a self-sufficient individual life is indicated in the Contrat Social in a discussion on the preconditions for the establishment of property as a right.

In general, to establish the right of the first occupier over a plot of ground, the following conditions are necessary: first, the land must not yet be inhabited; secondly, a man must occupy only the amount he needs for his subsistence; and, in the third place, possession must be taken, not by an empty ceremony, but by labour and cultivation, the only sign of proprietorship that should be respected by others, in default of a legal title.<sup>32</sup>

The right to a plot of land of its first occupier is recognised only when it is worked on for self-preservation and independence. When it



exceeds that needed for the fulfilment of natural needs, or when it is more than that which can be cultivated by one man, then it is illegitimate. It must therefore either be given up or become the source of inequality and slavery. It is with this view in mind that Rousseau suggests financial measures to obtain and maintain economic equality in the Discours sur l'Economie Politique.<sup>33</sup>

When property is viewed as a means to the self-sufficient independence of the individual, it becomes an external, legal apparatus necessary for the independent, free economic activity of man. Similarly, when property is seen as the "true foundation of civil society", it is because property is the only "real guarantee of the undertakings, that is of the work, of citizens."<sup>34</sup> What is important, therefore, in any egalitarian policy of the political government is its securing equal conditions of work, rather than an equal distribution of property itself.

Provision for the public wants is an obvious inference from the general will, and the third essential duty of government. This duty is not, we should feel, to fill the granaries of individuals and thereby to grant them a dispensation from labour, but to keep plenty so within their reach that labour is always necessary and never useless for its acquisition.<sup>35</sup>

Under such a government man must work for his subsistence for the one who does not work will be unable to achieve a means of subsistence. Herein lies the essence of the egalitarian policy of the political government. "Man in society is bound to work; rich or poor, weak or strong, every idler is a thief."<sup>36</sup>

How then can this positive notion of property - property as an external apparatus of independent life through one's own work - be





reconciled with the negative concept - property as the source of human misery - in the new society? How can the possession of property be controlled so that every man will live according to "necessity" by means of his "labour"<sup>37</sup> when the search for it tends to put one in competition, and in conflict, with others? How can the property of individuals be protected when, in order to do so, it is necessary to impose constraints upon individuals and upon the disposition of their goods?<sup>38</sup> For ultimately it may not be enough simply to obey the general will, to respect the laws, to love the patrie; it may not be even enough to "live simply" in such way that the produce of one's land, approved by the government, is sufficient to meet one's needs. Private property, once it is recognised as an entrenched private domain, must arouse amour-propre in the homme and disturb the balance between need and available resources. Consequently, the ideal of the political state must eventually be endangered. This is the dilemma that Rousseau's solution, "un idéal...de la bourgeoisie,"<sup>39</sup> could not resolve.

The separation of homme from citoyen and the establishment of property as a private area under governmental protection and as the basis of the individual's work for his preservation provide some ground for inferring the status of work in the new "civil society". First of all, work as the means to support individuals is regarded as a private affair rather than a social concern. Each individual is responsible of his own preservation and the government is to protect his work activity by providing appropriate economic conditions for him to feed himself by means of his work and be independent of others. No



public measures are considered in Rousseau's theory of "political economy" for those who become disabled and cannot work or to man whose occupations require higher technical experience and skills. Rather, the practical measures elaborated in the Discours sur l'Economie Politique consist, generally, in directing "the whole commerce of the State...into such channels as to provide for every need, without appearing to interfere,"<sup>40</sup> through suitable disposition of public money (aerarium or fisc) and land (domaine public) and through deliberate application of taxation. In other words, the backbone of governmental policy is to maintain "the distribution of provisions, money, and merchandise in just proportions" so that every individual may conduct his work activity in an appropriate economic environment. In spite of the legal State possession of all the property under its Sovereignty, the government is not, actually, allowed to lay constraints upon "the disposition of goods" of the people. As a result of this somewhat "negative" policy of the government, "work" is in reality subject to natural conditions of the market instead of to social control. This apparently contradictory view of work - contradictory to the theory of "total alienation" - is due directly to the theoretical weakness in Rousseau's argument that allows the existence of homme as a separate domain. Indirectly, it can be traced to the social and economic context of Rousseau's time, in which human work was mainly agrarian and commerce and foreign trade were perceived by intellectuals like Rousseau as something unnatural and improper.





## 2. Work in Education for Politicisation

In 1757 Madame d'Epainay wrote to Grimm, recalling a conversation with Rousseau:

But after all, we are not savages, said I to him; for good or bad, education is a necessity. How is it to be managed? It is certainly very difficult, he replied...To make your work easier...it would be necessary to begin with a total reconstruction of society. Otherwise, if you seek the advantage of your child, you will constantly be in the predicament of prescribing to him in his youth a crowd of very wise maxims which he will have to abandon.<sup>41</sup>

A "total reconstruction of society" means, in effect, a reduction of all the established advantages in the existing, "corrupt" society to those required by all men, that is, by a mere "man". On this ground, "man" may be reshaped in natural conditions to a member of a totally different society. Rousseau's education of "a natural man", which we have examined, pursued in this line the formation of "man", giving the child a vocational skill to support his "independent and free" life and an emotional readiness to share with his fellow men a mutual and cooperative intercourse. Once this goal is reached, however, education has to change its direction towards a transformation of this "man" into a member of the society which is the result of "total reconstruction". This new society, which is to achieve a true succession of the state of nature, claims to be a truly "political association" for solving the problems that men could not cope with by individual efforts, or by unthorough "political" measures. Therefore, the next step in Rousseau's educational scheme is characterised by its endeavour to "politicise" the young man. In this section we will examine in the first place the aspects of the politicisation in the new "civil society", laying focus on the status of "work", and then



turn to the "politicisation" of Emile at the time when he becomes an adult. This will be followed, finally, by an assessment of the meaning of work in the new political solution, both in politics and education.

WORK AND PUBLIC EDUCATION. -- As long as the new political State consists in the "association" of "free and independent" individuals, all existing forces within its territory will be integrated. Such a State demands, educationally, that its children be bound to the common cause which the State pursues. The individual child, who is merely a natural being, must become a citoyen, a part of the Sovereignty. All the children born in the community must be educated to partake in "the rights of citizenship" and to exercise the "duty" of citoyen.<sup>42</sup> This necessity for civic education is politically represented in the notion of educational "patriotism" which accustoms children from their early years "to regard their individuality only in its relation to the body of the State."<sup>43</sup> Children must come to know that they are parts and members of the whole society, and, moreover, to identify themselves with the State, to love it, and even to be able to sacrifice themselves for it when needed. Patriotism in Rousseau's educational doctrine begins with the need to integrate all the forces to the State; it develops into the view that patrie - a patriotic perception of the State - is the sole body that can transform "men" into a "people" distinguished from others. "It is the national institutions that form the genius, the character, the tastes, and the morale of a people, and make it





different from every other people."<sup>44</sup> The "national physiognomy"<sup>45</sup> which characterises a people comes as a natural consequence of a common political life within a country, one which calls for solidarity among the people, and provides a basis for "that ardent love of country". Patriotism and the national physiognomy fall into a reciprocal relationship spiralling each other upwards to a strong national entity. Consequently, a Polish child becomes at twenty years of age "a Pole and nothing but a Pole."<sup>46</sup> This mutual effect of patriotism and national physiognomy is to be encouraged, rather than to be discouraged by the political government, not only because the power of the State is grounded on it, but also because true human relations are possible only when men discard the mask of cosmopolitanism which conceals selfish drives and see themselves as belonging to a country. By being a citoyen, one can complete his being as an homme.<sup>47</sup> In this context, Rousseau thinks, the undertaking to "educate" its people is "one of the fundamental rules of popular or legitimate government."<sup>48</sup> The State undertakes the enterprise of forming its children into its citoyens, not along the particular wills of individuals, but along the general will for the common cause. This education, which Rousseau characterises as "public" or "national" education, combined with the "patriotism" which is to inspire in the mind of children, is a centrally important activity of the new society.

In "public" education, unlike "domestic" education, the place of the father is taken by the public authority. Like the father of a family over his children, the State assumes over its citoyens an



authority as well as a duty to "educate" them. Unlike the father, however, the State aims at forming a social man, a part of the State, and not a "natural Man". In the political State,

...as the reason of each man is not left to the sole arbiter of his duties, government ought the less indiscriminately to abandon to the intelligence and prejudices of fathers the education of their children, as that education is of still greater importance to the State than to the fathers: for, according to the course of nature, the death of the father often deprives him of the final fruits of education; but his country sooner or later perceives its effects. Families dissolve, but the State remains.<sup>49</sup>

As far as the task of the State as the educator of its citoyens is to direct them to the public cause, the education it conducts constitutes the sole mode of education which is permissible in the political State. Domestic education, which depends on the "intelligence" of the father, an individual "natural man", must be either suppressed or controlled in a suitable way so that the influence of the father's personal "prejudice" on his children may be avoided. Thus, in the political State the government prescribes regulations for its "public" education, determines the materials, order and form of the study of the children,<sup>50</sup> hires teachers, and controls their education at the hands of magistrates. However, such a priority laid upon public education does not actually exterminate domestic education, which may still be preferred by some parents who want "to have their children brought up under their own eyes."<sup>51</sup> Theoretically, domestic education is able to exist insofar as it is fitted to the particularity of the child, or of the family, and as long as it is not contradictory to the general will.

The political aim of public education is deliberately sought





by selecting suitable teachers, determining appropriate educational methods and environments, and adopting a proper sequence of educational stages. Patriotism being the major goal of education, teachers are selected among those who have been good examples in serving the State. "Illustrious warriors, bent under the weight of their laurels" are hired to teach "courage", and "upright Magistrates, grown white in the purple and on the bench" to teach "justice."<sup>52</sup> Supported by their authority and example, such teachers would "get themselves virtuous successors," and "transmit from age to age, to generations to come, the experience and talents of rulers, the courage and virtue of citizens, and common emulation in all to live and die for their country."<sup>53</sup> That the teachers must be good citoyens is also related to other qualifications for teaching. Of course a teacher must be the citoyen of the country. No foreigner is allowed to teach. In addition to this, "these teachers should if possible all be married men, distinguished for character and probity as well as for good sense and intelligence."<sup>54</sup> Unmarried men are seen as unsuitable for teaching because they are not enjoying a normal and proper social life. Even excellent teachers are not expected to regard their job as a profession because in the political State no permanent position is allowed except that of citoyen. Teachers are encouraged by a promise of an occupation of even greater repute after their term and thus their authority as well as their reputation is preserved.

The presentation to children of the good example of their teachers in service to the State constitutes by itself an educational method. Such examples may stimulate children to model themselves on



their teachers' enviable achievements. A second method adopted in "public" education consists in collecting children together and teaching them through group activities. Citoyen, the social man, is to be brought up, not in solitude, but in a collectivity.

They [children] should not be allowed to play separately at their own fancy, but made to play altogether and in public, so that there may always be a common end to which they aspire, and by which they are moved to rivalry and emulation. Parents who prefer domestic education and want to have their children brought up under their own eyes, ought nevertheless to send them to these exercises.<sup>55</sup>

It is through such a collectivist education that children come to have "sturdy" constitutions, and are accustomed to "discipline, to equality, to fraternity, to rivalry, to living under the eyes of their fellow-citizens and seeking public approbation."<sup>56</sup> Finally, public education adopts a method of education which lays emphasis on the physical growth of the child. Each school should have a gymnasium or place of physical exercise for children. "The training of the body", Rousseau says in the Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, "though much neglected, is, in my opinion, the most important part of education", not only because it makes the children "healthy and robust", but also because it brings about "moral effects, which are generally neglected altogether, or sought by teaching the child a number of pedantic precepts that are only so many misspent words."<sup>57</sup> By keeping children engaged in physical activity, the growing amour-propre, of which idleness is the hotbed, is suppressed, and amour de soi is developed into social pity and fraternity.

It is extremely easy to effect this in a good system of public education. The method is to keep the children always busy, not with troublesome lessons beyond their comprehension, which they hate, because (if for nothing else) they are compelled to remain in one place, but with exercises which give them pleasure by satisfying the needs of the growing body, and in







other ways besides.<sup>58</sup>

The same principle of "negative" education employed in the education of Emile to a natural man applies now in the education of children to social men.

The educational methods of utilising good examples, collectivistic group activities and physical activities may be suitably applied to children according to their developmental phases. Rousseau seems to apply the developmental laws of his Emile to "public" education when he writes: "If there are laws for the age of maturity, there ought to be laws for infancy, which teach obedience to others."<sup>59</sup> In accordance with the natural laws of development in the child, public education must endeavour to suppress bad inclinations from the early years of the children and to direct them to the public good. "It is too late", Rousseau says, "to change our natural inclinations, when they have taken their course, and egoism is confirmed by habit."<sup>60</sup> As far as purely political education is concerned, Rousseau provides in the Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne a few very short passages on the sequential allocation of educational materials:

A child ought to look upon his fatherland as soon as his eyes open to the light, and should continue to do so till the day of his death.<sup>61</sup>

When he is learning to read, I want him to read about his own country. At ten, he should be acquainted with all its productions; and at twelve, with all its provinces, highways, and towns. At fifteen, he should know all its history; at sixteen, all its laws.<sup>62</sup>

At twenty years of age, a Pole ought to be a Pole...<sup>63</sup>

From his birth the child will be exposed to the national



identity of his country and step by step guided to an understanding of its economic, geographical, historical, and political life. This procedure of guidance is basically the same as that by which Emile was introduced to material production through physical activities, to the development of reason, and finally, as we will soon see, to political relationships. As a principle of these educational procedures, Rousseau emphasises: "Everything depends on not destroying the natural man - 'the free individual'<sup>64</sup> - in adapting him to society."<sup>65</sup> The end-result is the "patriotism" of the grown-up citoyen, a participation which guides particular wills to be "in all things conformable to the general will" and makes individuals "voluntarily" will what is willed by the general will.<sup>66</sup>

In the new political State education is open to, and required for, all. Since the citoyens, be they rich or poor, are equal under the constitution, "they should be educated together, and in the same way."<sup>67</sup> For this purpose, if a completely gratuitous system is impossible, Rousseau suggests lowering fees to levels which the poorest can pay and establishing "a certain number of free places" for the poor in every school at the expense of the State. On the other hand, in order to enable schools to meet the needs of the government, Rousseau recommends the Berne system of "l'Etat extérieur" which, by organising schools as "a copy in miniature of all that constitutes the government of the republic", produces for the State administrative workers such as member of "a senate, chief magistrates, officers, ushers, advocates."<sup>68</sup> The subjection of education to the State cause constitutes the backbone of the "public" education.





In Rousseau's ideal of public education, it is notable that no mention is made of "work" which occupied the central position in the education of Emile as a natural man. Work as an essential condition for maintaining the "free and independent" natural, individual man disappears when the focus of discussion is brought to the public and political side of civil society. This suggests that for Rousseau man's work is an individual and private affair rather than a social and public concern. Even vocational training, which is today largely provided by public money, is never mentioned in his theory of "public education".

THE POLITICISATION OF EMILE: ADULTHOOD. -- We have seen in the preceding chapter that Emile, by acquiring work skills and the emotional maturity to associate with others on equal terms, has completed his development as a natural man and been prepared for joining an egalitarian society. The final step in Rousseau's educational plan is to give him a proper place in society. This adaptation to society is conducted in a two-fold way: on the one hand, Emile is led to establish a family and become its "head"; on the other, he is incorporated into a political State as its part, as a citoyen.

Rousseau views marriage as a relationship which complements both man and woman. The family was originally the first society, based on a convention between man and woman to fulfill their mutual desires. All the rights and obligations in marital relations



originate from this original agreement. Insofar as the desires which prompt it are natural, marriage is natural; insofar as the convention which creates it is social, it is social. Basically, however, marriage does not require man to discard his natural rights; rather, it secures them. To the newly married Emile and Sophy, Rousseau says: "Remember both of you, that you are free...."<sup>69</sup> Two partners are tied together by love, an extension of amour de soi and cooperate with each other in order to gain what they lack by the nature of their sex, and to preserve themselves by mutual assistance based on a consciousness of common ownership and common destiny. In this sense, Emile's family is a society which completes what he lacks naturally. As far as the external world is concerned, the family is an individual and private domain, just as it was in the natural society.

In the natural society the savage could remain something of a hermit within his family, for economically he was completely self-sufficient. No economic exchange was necessary. But in a civil state, where division of labour is a dominant way of production, no one can exclude himself from others; mutual intercourse and communication are necessary conditions for one's preservation. So, as a "head of a family" Emile, an homme, must be a citoyen of a "patrie" or the slave of a tyrant. Therefore, shortly before his marriage he is told:

Let us speak of yourself. You hope to be a husband and a father; have you seriously considered your duties? When you become the head of a family you will become a citizen of your country. And what is a citizen of the State? What do you know about it? You have studied your duties as a man, but what do you know of the duties of a citizen? Do you know the meaning of such terms as government, laws, country? Do you know the price you must pay for life, and for what you must be





prepared to die?...Before you take your place in the civil order, learn to perceive and know what is your proper place.<sup>70</sup>

Thus, Emile must adapt himself to an external social order as well as a family society. For Rousseau, this external society is hypothetically distinguished from the existing despotism which is characterised as "slavery". The slavery which emerged in the third stage of the civil state consisted in the subjection of men to a particular personal interest, and therefore the morality that governed relationships was merely the "law of strongest" which governed men in the natural state. The appearance of slavery meant the destruction of the first political society based on a partial contract and, actually, implied a return to the final stage of the natural state, a stage of "war of all against all". In such a situation, the notions of "patrie" and "citoyen" are meaningless: "The public institution no longer exists and no longer is capable to exist, because where there is no longer patrie there can no longer be citoyens. These two words, patrie and citoyen, should be struck out of modern languages."<sup>71</sup> The adaptation of Emile to society, that is, the socialisation of Emile, means at the same time a "politicisation", and Emile's entry into a political State means his participation in the social contract. Emile must complete his social being by becoming a citoyen of a patrie, one which unfortunately exists only in Rousseau's dreams.

In order to know what is his "proper place" in society Emile travels, compares different ways of life and different forms of government, and considers "questions of government, public morality, and political philosophy of every kind."<sup>72</sup> Being taught that "if there is any safe and lawful way of living without intrigues, without



lawsuits, without dependence on others, it is...to live by the labour of our hands, by the cultivation of our own land,"<sup>73</sup> Emile decides: "If my wealth makes a slave of me, I shall find it easy to renounce it. I have hands to work, and I shall get a living."<sup>74</sup> He thus settles down in an agricultural district because "the condition natural to homme is to cultivate the earth and live on its fruits,"<sup>75</sup> and becomes a citoyen of a "patrie" which actually does not exist yet, willing to serve it like the Romans who "sometimes left the plough to become a consul."<sup>76</sup> As the "head of a family", he remains an homme enclosed within the family; as a member of the political body, which is presumed hypothetically to exist at the moment of this politicisation, he becomes a citoyen. Emile's dual mode d'existence in society, however, does not treat the two elements - homme and citoyen - equally. As long as one's preservation in freedom and independence is possible in the civil state only by the maintaining of the political State, Emile gives priority in his value-system to his will as citoyen. The coexistence of homme with citoyen - this is the ultimate and inescapable consequence of the whole Rousseauist drama of human development, both phylogenically and ontogentially.

WORK AND THE POLITICAL SOLUTION. -- The fictitious citoyen in the Emile can be completely understood only by referring to the "citoyen" in the Contrat Social. The creation of a "public man", who is totally free from all the existing social evils and works in accord with the general will for the common cause in the political State; this is the common subject of the two works. The difference is that





one deals with the subject in political terms, while the other treats it in terms of educational procedures. In the sense that it produces such a "public man" (citoyen), the Emile is a contribution to the truly "political" solution to the problems caused by existing slavery. However, both in the Emile and in the Contrat Social the new "public man" (citoyen) does not completely replace the original "natural man" (homme). Rather, the notion of public man is treated as a means to preserve the natural man in the civil state, which is, despite all its social mechanisms, eventually a continuation of the egoistic final phase of the natural state. Unite and overcome all the obstacles to the preservation of yourselves! - it is such a logic that consequently secures in the "civil society" the natural, and private, man as an independent and inviolable domain, and forces the government to protect him, instead of maintaining him under a strict control for the public good.

In both theories, that of the social contract and of the adaptation of a natural man to the "civil society", work, together with property, is regarded as belonging to the private domain. They are then treated in the same ways as life and freedom. The government exists to protect these domains, not to attack them. Consequently, any governmental policy for economic equality must secure proper economic environments "not by taking away wealth from its possessors, but by depriving all men of means to accumulate it; not by building hospitals for the poor, but by securing the citizens from becoming poor."<sup>77</sup> By suitable disposition of public money and land and by wise application of taxation, the people are encouraged to keep their minds



in "simplicity" and their lives in "frugality", and to work by their hands so that they may be able to meet their needs by themselves. This may be, for Rousseau, the only way to prevent the accumulation of wealth and to prevent "the citizens from becoming poor".

Such a negative perception of the role of political government in human work is also reflected in the individual's perception of work. For the individual man, work is solely a private affair because though indirectly it may serve to keep the whole society in tranquility it serves to preserve himself and his family. Emile is supposed to leave his "plough" in order to become a "consul" when the State calls. This means that he will sacrifice his work, which is central to his private life, in order to serve the public cause which is important for the State.

The status accorded to work in Rousseau's political solution delimits the educational role that work can play in politicisation and in the new political State to the maintenance of individuals in freedom and independence in their private life. By learning work skills, a child attains a means by which he will earn, for himself and his family, a subsistence without which neither freedom nor independence will be possible. Work for preservation, however, does not require "perpetual labour". Work is necessary only inasmuch as it is adequate for procuring subsistence. Once what is necessary is secured, one should relax and enjoy other amusements. Thus, as is depicted in the Nouvelle Héloïse,<sup>78</sup> work can be pleasurable and proportionately mixed with play and other forms of amusements. It is





work, however, which secures a proper development of personality from amour de soi to pity and to love, including fraternity with man as a species. Employing man's power both physically and mentally, work checks the rising imagination which is apt to inspire amour-propre in the young man:

Reading, solitude, idleness, a soft and sedentary life, intercourse with women and young people, these are perilous paths for a young man, and these lead him constantly into danger. I divert his senses by other objects of senses; I trace another course for his spirits by which I distract them from the course they would have taken; it is by bodily exercise and hard work that I check the activity of the imagination, which was leading him astray. When arms are hard at work, the imagination is quiet; when the body is very weary, the passions are not easily inflamed.<sup>79</sup>

Even though the public schools will play no part in vocational training or "work education", the importance of properly conceived work activities in keeping the child in the path of a sound and healthy socialisation cannot be overestimated. Indeed, work education is a necessary condition for a political solution to the problems of society, that is, for the "homme" to become a "citoyen".



## NOTES

- 1 Contrat Social, OC, III, P. 351; SC/E, p. 5.
- 2 Ibid., p. 359.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid., p. 358; SC/E, p.13.
- 5 Ibid., p. 360: SC/E, p. 14.
- 6 Ibid., pp. 360-1.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid., p. 371; SC/E, p. 25.
- 9 Ibid., p. 378; SC/E, p. 32.
- 10 Ibid., p. 379; SC/E, p. 33.
- 11 Ibid., p. 378; SC/E, p. 32. My emphasis.
- 12 Ibid., pp. 364-5; SC/E, p. 19.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid., p. 374; SC/E, p. 29.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid., p. 373; SC/E, p. 27.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid., p. 363; SC/E, pp. 17-8.
- 19 Jimack, P.D., "Homme and Citoyen in Rousseau's Emile", The Romanic Review, LVI, Fe., 1965, p. 184.
- 20 Contrat Social, OC, III, p. 364; SC/E, p. 18.
- 21 Jimack, P.D., op. cit.
- 22 Emile, OC, IV, p. 248. My translation.
- 23 Contrat Social, OC, III, p. 420.





24 Ibid., p. 377.

25 Ibid., p. 367; SC/E, p. 21.

26 Ibid., p. 365; SC/E, p. 20.

27 Ibid., p. 367.

28 Discours sur l'Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 262; SC/E, p. 271.

29 Ibid., p. 263; SC/E, p. 271.

30 Ibid.

31 For Rousseau, agriculture is "le premier et le plus respectable de tous les arts", (Emile, OC, IV, p. 40) because "la conditions naturelle à l'homme est de cultiver la terre et de vivre de ses fruits". (Nouvelle Héloïse, OC, II, p. 53) Agriculture is "la première vocation de l'homme" which reminds of "tous le charmes de l'âge d'or". (ibid., p. 603) On the other hand, commerce is rejected, or degraded, because, though it may "enrichir quelques particuliers, même quelques villes...la nation entière n'y gagne rien, et le peuple n'en est pas mieux". (Contrat Social, OC, III, p. 392) Commerce and money are rather regarded as something that reflect the vice of today: "Les anciens Politiques parloient sans cesse de mœurs et de vertu; les nôtres ne parlent que de commerce et d'argent". (Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, OC, III, p. 19)

32 Contrat Social, OC, III, p. 366; SC/E, p. 20.

33 See section "III". Discours sur l'Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 262ff.

34 Ibid., p. 262; SC/E, p. 271.

35 Ibid.

36 Emile, OC, IV, p. 469; EM/E, p. 158.

37 Contrat Social, OC, III, p. 366.

38 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 267.

39 Lecerle, J.-L., "Rousseau et Marx", in Leigh, R.A. (ed.), Rousseau after Two Hundred Years, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p. 70.

40 Economie Politique, p. 267; SC/E, p. 275.

41 Boyd, W. (ed.), The Minor Educational Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Columbia University, New York, 1962, p. 103.

42 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 260; SC/E, p. 268.



43 Ibid., p. 259; SC/E, p. 268.

44 Boyd, W. (ed.), op. cit., p. 96.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., p. 97.

47 "...nous ne commençons proprement à devenir hommes qu'après avoir été Citoyens". (Contrat Social, Manuscrit de Genève, OC, III, p. 287.

48 Economie Politique, OC, III, pp. 260-1; SC/E, p. 269.

49 Ibid., p. 260; SC/E, pp. 268-9.

50 Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, OC, III, p. 966.

51 Ibid., p. 968; Boyd, W. (ed.), op. cit., p. 99.

52 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 261; SC/E, p. 270.

53 Ibid.

54 Gouvernement de Pologne, OC, III, p. 967; Boyd, W. (ed.), op. cit., p. 98.

55 Ibid., p. 968; Boyd, W. (ed.), p. 99.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 260; SC/E, p. 268.  
Translation partially revised.

60 Ibid.

61 Gouvernement de Pologne, OC, III, p. 966; Boyd, W. (ed.), p. 97.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 della Volpe, G., Rousseau and Marx, translated by Fraser, J., Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1978, p. 93.

65 Nouvelle Héloïse, OC, II, p. 612. My translation.

66 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 254; SC/E, p. 262.





- p. 98.
- 67 Gouvernement de Pologne, OC, III, p. 967; Boyd, W. (ed.),
  - 68 Ibid., pp. 968-9; Boyd, W. (ed.), p. 100.
  - 69 Emile, OC, IV, p. 864; EM/E, p. 441.
  - 70 Ibid., p. 823; EM/E, p. 412.
  - 71 Ibid., p. 250. My translation.
  - 72 Ibid., p. 836; EM/E, p. 421.
  - 73 Ibid., p. 835; EM/E, p. 421.
  - 74 Ibid., p. 857; EM/E, p. 436.
  - 75 Nouvelle Héloïse, OC, II, p. 534. My translation.
  - 76 Emile, OC, IV, p. 860; EM/E, p. 284.
  - 77 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 258; SC/E, p. 267.
  - 78 Nouvelle Héloïse, Part IV, Letter X, OC, II, pp. 440-70.
  - 79 Emile, OC, IV, p. 643-4; EM/E, p. 284.



## CHAPTER FIVE:

### Conclusion

This study has explored the concept of work in Jean Jacques Rousseau's educational theory. Treating the educational ideas in the Emile as essentially a projection of Rousseau's phylogenic account of the social progress of man, the study examined the changing role of work activity in the education recommended for Emile's different developmental phases. These various educational work activities were related to the hypothetical history which describes the move from the state of nature through the civil state and ultimately to a new egalitarian society.

Chapter Two began with an examination of Rousseau's concept of the "state of nature". Much of his analysis was concerned not with the theoretically pure "state of nature" but with the societe naissante, where man had already begun to civilise himself. Thus, considerable attention was directed to the process by which men emerged out of mere animals. The "savage man", or the man of animality (l'homme d'animalite), was hardly different from other animals. His activity to preserve himself was determined entirely by his instinct. However, in his interaction with his environment the





savage man came to develop his native faculties, in particular, his drive for perfectibility and his free will, and ultimately distinguished himself from other animals and subjugated them under his control. In the long phylogenic process of coping with the environment, man came to "compare" his simple sensations and to form simple ideas. He then acquired more complicated conceptual notions concerning himself, external things and other human beings, and developed a certain "raison sensible" and a will. With this new mental equipment, man adopted a more positive approach to the external world in order to transform it for his use. This purposeful and intentional activity was what we now call "work". With work activity, man secured his preservation and on this ground established equal relationships with his fellow-men. This new social phase, which Rousseau calls "the savage society" or "the natural society", meant a completion of the process of hominisation, of man's distinguishing himself from other animals.

In the second part of the chapter Rousseau's educational prescriptions for the developing child were examined. They revealed a projection of the phylogenic progress of man onto the ontogenic development of a child. A child should be left from his birth to the natural relationships dictated by necessity. Although the child is largely dependent on others for his preservation, he must be permitted and even encouraged to fulfill his natural needs by his own activity. With his growing physical strength, this area of spontaneity must be expanded and the child taught with a new positive and purposeful notion of "utility". The notion of utility, introduced when the child



is transformed from a mere being of sensation to one of "raison sensible", provides a criterion for the selection of activity to fulfill one's needs. What is in service of one's natural needs is good; and what is not is bad. Intellectually, the notion of utility helps to form a rational way of thinking; emotionally, it promotes the natural passion of amour de soi which becomes the basis of appropriate social passions such as "pity" and love.

The learning of work skills, which aids in the child's growth through "useful" activities, prepares a material ground on which he may sustain his independent life when he becomes a grown-up man. For this reason, work education is a crucial aspect of the formation of a "natural man". The pedagogical notions of "necessity", "utility" and "work" are all in a line in the sense that they reflect a certain relationship of forces in the individual and his environment. In infancy, the child is subjected totally to the "necessity" of nature; he then in early childhood applies the criterion of "utility" to his activity, attempting to control himself and his environment; finally, he "works" upon external materials, projecting his imagination and intelligence, and transforming the world in accordance with his needs. This process of child development and of educational procedure is essentially a projection of the phylogenic process of human progress, by which the species man liberated himself from, and eventually controlled, the "necessity" of nature in accordance with his own needs.

Rousseau's pedagogical program for the development of a





natural man, involves the child in total engagement - "total" in the sense that he employs both mental and physical powers - in his actions for securing what is "useful" to himself. From the first, the child is to be placed in actual life situations and encouraged to learn and grow through activities initiated by himself. The educational effect of these activities, crowned by "work", is not only to produce goods to be consumed or results to satisfy his direct needs, but also a healthy body and a proper knowledge of materials and human relationships, which can be applied to actual life situations. Most significantly, work as a productive and practical activity inspires intellectual curiosity which is, in turn, satisfied by his work. It is this cyclical movement between the mental and physical poles that propels the child ever forwards and upwards. Thus, working like a peasant, he comes to be able to think like a philosopher. In this connection Rousseau's educational use of work provides a considerable support for those who believe education should aim at the all-round development of the child.

Chapter Three described the process of the decline of the "natural society" and the movement towards the slavery of the existing civil society. The elements in man and society that were responsible for this social and psychological degeneration included the institution of property and the division of labour. The primitive notion of property that emerged in the savage community as a social convention, recognised the significance of the individual's work for his "self-sufficient" family life. It was thus perceived by Rousseau in a positive sense. Indeed, property, which secured man's



self-sufficient and therefore "independent" life, contributed to "free" and mutual relationships between individuals and between families. A crucial moment in the degeneration of property into a social evil was that which saw the introduction of the arts of agriculture and metallurgy, and the consequent emergence of the first social division of labour. By producing more than before, man forced himself to need more than before and thus to seek goods produced by other men.

Rousseau viewed this moment as the beginning of human dependence. However, in our examination of Rousseau's theory, the division of labour itself was not held to be responsible for the new desire of man for more goods. For if man desired exactly the amount of "iron" which he could get by exchanging the extra "wheat" he produced by his work, the basic quality of "self-sufficiency" in his life would be maintained; consequently he might be still "free and independent". Indeed, if the faculty of "perfectibility", which resulted in man's self-elevation out of mere animality, had been allowed to operate, it may be assumed that the division of labour was a stage in human progress which, properly organised, could have relieved man's labour and increased the leisure and "amusements", both of men and of women.

If the technical progress itself is not held to be responsible for the new search for more goods, then the suspicion must be laid upon social and psychological factors. The division of labour, which was a totally new way of production, destroyed the self-sufficiency of





the natural man by introducing a new market system of exchange. This implied an increase of contact both between individuals and between families. This greatly increased contact saw the growth of a new psychological phenomenon of amour-propre, which comes out of the comparison of self with others. It was this passion of amour-propre that provoked the need for more goods, and consequently, by awakening the need to produce more, made property a central concern of the whole society. Increased productivity and the new notion of property as a means of endless accumulation fed in turn the growing amour-propre. The whole process of the decline of the natural state and of the development of the civil state examined in Chapter Two may be characterised as vicious reciprocal interaction between amour-propre and its economic and social effects.

Amour-propre is perceived by Rousseau as the major cause of man's social degeneration; it must thus be retarded and suppressed in a child's education. In the second part of the chapter conventional education in the existing civil society was examined. By means of this education, men, the slaves of amour-propre, perpetuate their existing social advantages by inculcating the prejudice of the existing society. But if education aims at a natural man, who is "free and independent" and neither slavish nor hypocritical, the prejudice of man, together with amour-propre to which it is in service, must be suppressed thoroughly. Therefore, when the learning of work skills comes inevitably to face the "industrial arts", that is, the division of labour, Rousseau carefully eliminated the "moral" effects of this mode of production, strictly confined all learning to



the technical side, and developed in the child's mind a notion of society based on exchange between equals and on equal terms.

Such a negative measure is not in itself enough to suppress the growing amour-propre in the child's mind. "Positive" endeavours must be undertaken to preserve in the child's mind his amour de soi, and on this ground to develop a healthy social pity, a love of the opposite sex, and a fraternity with his fellow-men. To form "natural man", one patterned on the savage in the âge d'or of man, Rousseau suggested that, soon after the child's acquisition of work ability, he be "taught" to tame his passions and put them under rational control. Thus is completed a "natural man", able to conduct a "free and independent" intercourse with other men in social situations. In this final aspect of the formation of a natural man, work abilities provide a basis for emotional training, not only because they become the material foundation of an independent economic activity, but also because the process of acquiring work ability helps suppress the growing amour-propre. Keep the child's mind in simplicity and check the imagination that directs him to desire more than he is able to procure - this basic formula for combatting the "evil" passion of amour-propre is applied in the whole educational scheme through encouraging the child to engage in "bodily exercises and hard work". By being physically engaged in satisfying his natural needs according to the principle of "utility", the child's growing imagination is calmed and he remains content with the preservation of himself in simplicity and freedom. It is actually on this basis that his natural compassion is developed into social "pity" and fraternity with other





men. Only when the child is brought up in this fashion, will he be able to view other men as his equals rather than objects of envy or as tools to satisfy his selfish desires. Thus Rousseau argues for the employment of work activities in education as a means to develop a healthy social personality.

In Chapter Four, Rousseau's views of a new egalitarian society was introduced. A political solution to the problems caused by the existing order could be achieved only by man entering into a new "social contract" and creating a new political State. The basic strategy of the "social contract" was to bring together all the existing social forces into a "single motive power", so as to abolish the established despotism and slavery and secure the individual in freedom and independence. Each person in the community participates in the contract by totally "alienating" all that he has to the new political body. The body politic which is thus created represents the common interest of its members, subjugates all the private, particular wills to the general will, and forces individuals to be free and independent by maintaining a social justice within the community. There are thus no more masters, no more slaves. In reality, however, the political government returns to the individual what he has given up and even protects this property with an extraordinary power. Consequently, man in this new "civil society", in giving himself to all, "actually gives himself to nobody", and renders more secure his life, property and freedom all of which are essential to his individuality. Thus the social contract ensures man the retention of his particular individual being (homme) by incorporating him as a part



of the body politic (citoyen). In this connection, individual man comes to possess a dual character in the new society.

The separation of homme from citoyen originates from Rousseau's hypothetical perception of the société naissante. In the natural society, that is, in the second stage of the state of nature, the savage worked, in addition to hunting and fishing, on the land he occupied, both for his own and his family's preservation. For the rest of time, he sang and danced with his neighbours for amusements. Here Rousseau points out a primordial separation of what is "private" from what is "public". The preservation of oneself and one's family belongs to the "private", while play and other forms of peaceful intercourse fall into the "public" domain. Since preservation is regarded as being a private matter, its necessary conditions, work and property, are also perceived as conditions of private life, although property is to be protected by a social convention.

This basic separation between "private" and "public" in the savage society is to be reproduced in the new "civil society". The citoyen as a "public" man, that is as a part of the State, is conceived as an ideal type incarnating not only all the virtues and powers required to fulfill his political responsibilities, but also having a need to maintain "mutual and independent" relationships with other men, that is, other "private" men. Thus the individual as a natural man, whose essential ground of existence is his family, is not to be completely replaced by the new political man; rather, the political man is to be conceived in terms which help preserve the





natural man. As a citoyen, an individual may regard his work and property, as well as his life and freedom, as belonging to the State, because this was, de jure, the precondition for his becoming a citoyen; but as an homme he regards himself as being authorised by the State to possess an exclusive right over his work and property just as he does over his life and freedom. For the political government, "to prescribe the conditions according to which he [an individual man] can dispose of them [his goods] is in reality less to alter his right as it appears, than to extend it in fact."<sup>1</sup> Thus, both in the "natural" and in the "civil" societies, work and property as a prerequisite of work fall into the private sector and are regarded as indispensable aspects of man's individuality.

Educationally, such a view of work bears important implications. To begin with, as long as preservation is viewed as a prime responsibility of the individual, a child's development becomes almost synonymous with his growth in ability to procure his subsistence. Just as the savage became a full man, "free and independent", only when he came to support himself by work that utilised his will and intelligence, so the formation of a "man" (homme) is completed only when he comes to possess developed work abilities. This view of a developed work ability as a central element in the proper education of man is tremendously suggestive, even today, for those who consider education in terms of the real happiness of the child.

However, Rousseau's view of work as a private concern imposes



severe limits upon the "public" power in terms of its responsibility and mandate to impose the conditions of work, both politically and educationally. It was the division of labour that had dissolved the state of nature and ushered in civilisation. In the resultant society, work is divided into various occupations and levels. Men work in different ways and their rewards are extremely varied. Keeping work in the private domain means that existing and consequent inequalities in working conditions and rewards fall outside the concern of government. Work is private, property is private, the economic mechanism of exchange is private. Yet it is the existence of this independent domain, existing under, and protected by, the "political" government, that ferments egoism and ultimately degenerates the political contract into a mere "abstraction".

Educationally, such a view of work as a private affair precludes "public" education from the possibility of encouraging vocational training in schools. Indeed, it prohibits any integration of homme and citoyen by combining the education of political man with the education of the individual, natural man. But certainly public education cannot succeed when it is merely and solely "political" and inculcates monotonous precepts to sacrifice individual well-being to the public cause. Only when the education of the natural man is subsumed under, and integrated with, that of the citoyen in public education, is it possible to produce a man who see in the public cause his individual interest. And this must involve the inclusion of work and education in the education sponsored by the public power.





Rousseau's particular view of the "natural man" as an independent agent in the political State thus contains a contradiction to his idea of a political remedy for the existing social "evils". For, as the "political revolutions" which began to burst out within a few decades of his death were to demonstrate, "conceptual" and "abstract" political power was apt to remain so; the newly created "State" was thus incapable of intervening in the "war of all against all" in the emerging capitalist "civil society". Such a theoretical weakness reflects Rousseau's inability to escape from the historical conditions of his own age.

This study is a comprehensive attempt to determine the significance of work in Rousseau's educational theory. In spite of some theoretical weakness in his view of the political solution to social problems, his ideas regarding the pedagogical use of work are presumed to have been entirely new to his contemporaries, for whom education was formalised and isolated both from actual life and from the natural development of the child. That Rousseau, by adopting a methodology of opposing the state of nature to the civil state, successfully initiates a thorough reconsideration of education, as well as of politics, is clearly one of the factors which have made him one of the founders of modern thought. As to why Rousseau proposed such an apparently radical pedagogical approach; as to the sources of his theory and his contribution to general and educational history, all these are important questions. They must, however, be answered by other studies.



## NOTES

- 1 Economie Politique, OC, III, p. 263; SC/E, p. 272.





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
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